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THE PRIVILEGES AND 
IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF 
ARTICLE IV 
David S. Bogen* 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV is deeply rooted in the histori-
cal context of English law. It developed from colonial charter provisions and the 
position of the colonists as subjects of a common king, evolved as the colonies ex-
panded, survived the Revolutionary War in the Articles of Confederation and was 
eventually adopted in the Constitution. This Article traces the history of the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause in order to elaborate on the original intent embodied in its 
language. 
Professor Bogen states that the clause did not embody natural law concepts, but 
was solely concerned with creating a national citizenship. He contends that fear of a 
natura/law interpretation has incorrectly prevented the Court from finding the clause 
applicable to citizens in the state where they reside. He suggests that a full examina-
tion of the historical origin of the clause could lead to a more concrete basis for 
judicial interpretation. In addition to the right to be free of discrimination based on 
non-residence when citizens of one state visit another state, the author concludes that 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV secured for citizens of the United 
States the right to interstate travel and to become citizens of other states without dis-
crimination based on place of prior residence. 
THE COMMITTEE appointed to prepare an Exposition of the Con-
federation, a plan for its complete execution and supplemental ar-
ticles report, ... that the Confederation requires execution ... [b]y 
describing the privileges and immunities to which the citizens of one 
State are entitled in another. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The first sentence of article IV, section 2 of the United States 
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West and Greg Young, saved me from some errors; but they are, of course, not responsible 
for those that perversely remain. 
J. 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 894 (G. Hunted. 
1912) [hereinafter JOURNALS]. 
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Constitution sets forth the obligation which each state owes to the 
citizens of other states: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled 
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."2 
This provision was derived from article IV of the Articles of Con-
federation which James Wilson described at the Constitutional 
Convention as "the Article of Confederation making the Citizens of 
one State Citizens of all."3 Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Feder-
alist Papers that: "It may be esteemed the basis of the Union that 
the 'citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the several States.' "4 
The principle that states have a special obligation to the citizens 
of other states was crucial in developing a common national iden-
tity. Fortunately, the principle's vitality did not depend upon pre-
cise definition of the obligation it imposed, for uncertainty over its 
application was voiced at the outset. When the Articles of Confed-
eration were ratified, the congressional committee on implementa-
tion noted a need to describe the privileges and immunities which 
citizens of one state were entitled to in another state under article 
IV's predecessor.5 Neither the committee nor Congress ever clari-
fied the clause further. 
Two centuries after the article IV privileges and immunities 
clause ("clause") was adopted, disagreement continues over its 
meaning and application.6 The clause's history has played little role 
in the debate. The absence in judicial opinion of any detailed his-
torical study of the clause reflects in part the lack of discussion in 
scholarly literature.7 One reason for this absence may be the spar-
2. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. I. 
3. NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY 
JAMES MADISON 441 (A. Koch ed. 1966) [hereinafter NOTES OF DEBATES]. See also THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 272 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) [hereinaf-
ter RECORDS). 
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 478 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
5. See supra note I and accompanying text. 
6. Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) (6-3 decision on 
whether privileges and immunities is limited category of fundamental rights or whether all 
discrimination must be justified); United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Cam-
den, 465 U.S. 208 (1984) (8-1 decision on application of clause to laws discriminating on basis 
of municipal residence); Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) (application of 
a least restrictive alternative test to discrimination). See also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 
71 (1982) (O'Conner, J., concurring); Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 106 S. Ct. 2317, 
2329, 2330, 2333 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (argue that the right to settle in another 
state is protected through an art. IV basis to challenge durational residency requirements). 
7. But see P. FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERAl.ISM AND 
COMITY 30-40 (1981) (impact of art. IV on interstate travel with slaves); J. KE"IINER, 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMioRICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 220-30 (1978) (notes 
HeinOnline -- 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 796 1986-1987
796 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:794 
sity of the record on the clause's adoption. There is virtually no 
report of significant discussion of the clause's meaning prior to its 
adoption in the Constitution. Only scattered comments and early 
drafts shed light on its intended scope. 
This Article sets forth the fragmentary record of article IV's 
adoption and speculates, based on that record, about the intent of 
the article IV Framers. It poses more questions than it answers, for 
a closer look at the clause's origins discloses the relevance of colo-
nial and English feudal history. This Article is a preliminary 
sketch. It is intended to encourage others to explore and augment 
the story or to demonstrate that the development took a different 
line. 
The outline drawn here suggests that the privileges and immuni-
ties clause was not a reference to natural law, but was solely con-
cerned with creating a national citizenship. It referred to the rights 
of citizens of the nation to travel freely among the states, to become 
full citizens of any state they wished without discrimination based 
on place of prior residence, and to be free of discrimination based 
on nonresidence when they merely visited another state. At the 
same time, privileges and immunities were an evolving concept, so 
that the specific understandings held in 1787 should not control 
modem decisions. These tentative conclusions support Justice 
O'Connor's position that durational residence cases should be ana-
lyzed under Article IV. They also support the proposition that all 
laws are within privileges and immunities clause, and that the key 
issue under Article IV is whether distinctions based on residence 
can be justified. 
I. COLONIAL CHARTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF ENGLISHMEN 
[A]ll and every the Persons being our Subjects, which shall 
dwell and inhabit within every or any of the said several Colonies 
and Plantations, and every of their children, which shall happen 
to be born within any of the Limits and Precincts of the said 
several Colonies and Plantations, shall HAVE and enjoy all Lib-
erties, Franchises, and Immunities, within any of our other Do-
minions, to all Intents and Purposes, as if they had been abiding 
sparseness of debate on art. IV in Constitution or Articles of Confederation); R. HOWELL, 
THE PRIVILEGES & IMMUNITIES OF STATE CITIZENSHIP (1918) (art. IV traced to treatment 
afforded alien merchants in England); Antieau, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the True ,'lfean-
ing of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv. I (1967) 
(art. IV permits federal enforcement of natural rights); Comment. The Illferstate Privileges 
and Immunities: Fundamellfal Rights or Federalism, 15 CAP. U.L. REv. 493 (1986) (funda-
mental rights analysis violates intent of Framers). 
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and born, within this our Realm of England, or any other of our 
said Dominions. 8 
797 
The absence of prolonged public controversy over the adoption 
of the privileges and immunities clause in both the Articles of Con-
federation and the Constitution indicates that the principle was not 
an innovation. The Articles were drafted during the American 
Revolution; consequently, the clause's background must be sought 
in pre-revolutionary rights in colonies other than the colonists' 
own.9 Those rights flowed from political theory, express agreement 
and experience. The colonists had a common political tie to the 
King of England, colonial charters that expressly guaranteed them 
rights in other colonies, and practical experience of movement 
across the colonial boundaries. 
A. Subjects of a Common King-Calvin's Case 
The colonists, like all King's subjects, were free from alienage 
disabilities under English common law in English courts. Further-
more, the courts in the British colonies followed this common law 
principle and, therefore, colonists were free from the disabilities of 
alienage in the courts of other colonies. This principle was clearly 
stated in 1608, on the eve of colonization, when Lord Edward Coke 
and the English judges decided Calvin's Case. 10 Under English law, 
aliens could not own real property in England. The question in 
Calvin's Case was whether one born in Scotland, after the Scottish 
King James had ascended the English throne, could inherit English 
land. Although England and Scotland had a common king, each 
had a separate parliament. Lord Coke held that persons subject to 
the same King could not be aliens to each other. "Lastly, whoso-
8. THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER 
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE 
FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3788 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909) {citing the Virginia 
Charter of 1606) [hereinafter THORPE]. 
9. The Articles of Confederation brought in the rule that membership might be 
transferred from one state to another. While there is here doubtless the original 
expression of this character by the lawmaking body common to the new union, and 
is perhaps a new quality in federations, yet there must be taken into account the 
earlier common English citizenship of the great majority of the members of the 
Confederation, and the common rights that it involved. Those, whether continued 
or not throughout the preliminary states of their combination, must have done 
much to render intercitizenship in the federation inevitable. In other words. if here 
is a new character in federations, it is because this is a federation born out of condi-
tions to which the new character was fundamental. 
F. FRANKI.IN, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NATURALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 
FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO 1861, at 15-16 {1906). 
10. W. SWINDLER, SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 
68-93 (D. Musch ed. 1979) (ann. reprint of 2 WHARTON'S STATE TRIALS 607-58). 
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ever at his birth cannot be an alien to the king of England, cannot 
be an alien to any of his subjects of England." 11 
Coke's reasoning applied to the colonists. Since they settled 
pursuant to a royal patent, they remained royal subjects. Under 
Calvin's Case, colonists could not be aliens under English law. That 
meant, however, only that persons born outside of England who 
were born subject to the King could still inherit property in Eng-
land under its common law. 
Calvin's Case did not limit the discretion of the King in the exer-
cise of his prerogative or Parliament in the exercise of its power. 
Both could discriminate among subjects on the basis of place of 
birth. Indeed, early colonial trade laws did discriminate against 
Scottish traders. 12 Protection against such discrimination depended 
upon a commitment by the body with power to act. Since the 
Crown had authority to establish the laws in the colonies, colonists 
looked to the King for a commitment against discriminatory treat-
ment when embarking upon the voyage to new lands. 
B. Charter Guarantees 
Charter provisions promised colonists the privileges, liberties, 
franchises and immunities of Englishmen in any of the King's colo-
nies. Subsequently, the charter guarantees were used as a model for 
the privileges and immunities clause. 
The first English settlements in North America were commer-
cial ventures founded by individuals or companies operating under 
a patent granted by the Crown. The grant was a feudal relic which 
presumed foreign lands to be royal lands which the Crown could 
bestow to others. Sir Humphrey Gilbert received a grant for com-
mercial activities in 1573, and Sir Walter Raleigh obtained a grant 
in 1584. Neither established a successful colony, but the documents 
supporting their efforts set the pattern for future charters. 
In Gilbert's patent, Queen Elizabeth granted to every person 
born within her allegiance and those properly under the patent "the 
privileges of free denizens and persons native of England, and 
within our allegiance, any law, custome or usage to the contrary 
notwithstanding." 13 The patent was an exercise of royal power: the 
II. /d. at 90. 
12. The acts of Union in 1707 by the parliaments of England and Scotland created the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain, "thereby admitting the Scots to partnership in overseas 
enterprises from which English policy had theretofore sought to exclude them:· W. CRA-
VEN, THE COLONIES IN TRANSITION 1660-1713, at 313 (1968). 
13. W. SWINDI ER. supra note 10. at 61. The patent to Raleigh was similar: persons 
HeinOnline -- 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 799 1986-1987
1987] PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 799 
bestowed "privileges" were tied to the nature and scope of the 
King's prerogative. 14 The patent also gave Sir Humphrey the 
power to create and to administer the law. The grant of "privi-
leges" to others implicated only limited civil rights, such as land 
ownership, and not political rights. The assurance that colonists 
would keep their English-law "privileges" encouraged emigration to 
America. While France and Spain deemed their colonists beyond 
the law because they were beyond the boundaries of the kingdom, 
English colonists kept the "liberties, franchises, and immunities" of 
the English at home. 15 
The first two colonies, Virginia and Massachusetts, were 
founded by joint stock companies possessing a royal charter. The 
Virginia Company charter provided: 
[a]ll and every the Persons being our Subjects, which shall 
dwell and inhabit within every or any the said several Colonies 
and Plantations, and every of their children, which shall happen 
to be born within any of the Limits and Precincts of the said 
several Colonies and Plantations, shall HAVE and enjoy all Lib-
erties, Franchises, and Immunities, within any of our other Do-
minions, to all Intents and Purposes, as if they had been abiding 
and born, within this our Realm of England, or any other of our 
said Dominions. 16 
Maryland's proprietary grant contained a similar "privileges, 
franchises and liberties" provision.17 Indeed, virtually every col-
"shall and may have all the privileges of free Denizens, and persons native of England, and 
within our allegiance in such like ample maner and fourme, as if they were borne and person-
ally resident within our said Real me of England, any Ia we, custome, or usage to the contrary 
notwithstanding." Id. at 65. 
14. Denizens were aliens in England who were given special status by the King's pre-
rogative. The status enabled the denizen to purchase and own, but not inherit, lands in Eng-
land. Only Parliament could consent to a permanent transfer of real property to a person not 
born subject to the English King. J. KETTNER, supra note 7, at 30-31. The reference to 
denizens in this early patent as the measure of the privileges granted emphasizes the relation-
ship between "privileges" and the prerogative. Most of the later charters purported to mea-
sure "liberties, privileges, franchises or immunities" by those enjoyed by the English, without 
reference to denizens. 
15. These included trial by jury, benefit of clergy, and all the rights of possession 
and inheritance of land as in England. The new lands in America were legally a 
part of the king's demesne and were held as of a royal manor in England ... in free 
and common socage, thus making it clear that though the new colonies might be 
outside the realm-as far as the payment of customs dues went and representation 
in parliament was concerned-they were within the realm in all that pertained to 
their legal and tenurial rights. Englishmen passing beyond the sea were Englishmen 
still, with an Englishmen's safeguards and restrictions. 
C. ANDREWS, 1 THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY 86 (1934). 
16. 7 THORPE, supra note 8, at 3788 (citing Virginia Charter of 1606). 
17. [L]ikewise all privileges, franchises and liberties of this our kingdom of Eng-
land, freely, quietly, and peaceably to have and possess, and the same may use and 
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any's charter provided that English subjects and their children who 
lived in the colony be treated as Englishmen. 18 In most of the colo-
nies, the original proprietary grant or company charter was surren-
dered to the King, who governed through royal governors. 
Colonists understood, however, that the "liberties, privileges, 
franchises and immunities" of England continued to apply under 
royal as well as proprietary or corporate governance. 
These charter guarantees resemble the article IV provisions of 
the Constitution. 19 Each secures to persons related to a local area 
enjoy in the same manner as our liege-men born, or to be born within our said 
kingdom of England, without impediment, molestation, vexation, impeachment, or 
grievance of US, or any of our heirs or successors; any statute, act, ordinance or 
provision, to the contrary thereof notwithstanding. 
LAWS OF MARYLAND 5 (V. Maxcy ed. 1811) (hereinafter LAWS] (citing Charter of 
Maryland). 
18. J. KETINER, supra note 7, at 65. The Charter of New England stated 
All and every the Persons, beinge our Subjects ... shall have and enjoy all Liberties, 
and Ffranchizes, and Immunities of free Denizens and naturall Subjects within any 
of our other Dominions, to all Intents and Purposes, as if they had been abidinge 
and born within this our Kingdome of England, or any other our Dominions. 
3 THORPE, supra note 8, at 1839. 
The Connecticut Charter of 1662 secured all subjects born in the province "all Liberties 
and Immunities of free and natural Subjects within any the Dominions of Us, Our Heirs or 
Successors, to all Intents, Constructions and Purposes whatsoever, as if they and every of 
them were born within the realm of England." 1 THORPE, supra note 8, at 533 (emphasis in 
original). 
Rhode Island's Charter in 1663 contained nearly identical language securing "alllibertyes 
and immunityes of ffree and naturall subjects within any the dominions of us ... to all 
intents, constructions and purposes, whatsoever, as if they, and every of them, were borne 
within the realme of England." 6 THORPE, supra note 8, at 3220. 
North Carolina's Charter in 1663 was explicit in providing for rights of property for 
persons born in that colony "as likewise all liberties, franchises and priviledges of this our 
kingdom of England, and of other our dominions aforesaid ... as our liege people born 
within the same." 5 THORPE, supra note 8, at 2747. 
Georgia's 1732 Charter was closer to the original phrasing of Virginia. promising that all 
persons born in the province "shall have and enjoy all liberties, franchises and immunitie~ of 
free denizens and natural born subjects, within any of our dominions. to all intents and pur-
poses as if abiding and born within this our kingdom of Great-Britain. or any other of our 
dominion." 2 THORPE, supra note 8, at 773. 
19. First, "our Subjects, which shall dwell and inhabit within every or any the said 
several Colonies and Plantations," 7 THORPE, supra note 8, at 3788. is the charter equivalent 
of article IV's "the citizens of each state." U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 2, cl. I. Both phrases refer 
to the people who lived in the colony and mwd allegiance to the authority of that territory. 
Second, the charter language "shall HAVE and enjoy all Liberties, Franchises and Immu-
nities," 7 THORPE, supra note 8, at 3788. parallels the art. IV phrase "shall be entitled to all 
privileges and immunities." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. cl. I. Charter guarantees u~ed various 
formulations for the guarantee. including "privilege~:· "liberties." "franchise~ ... and ''immu-
nities." 
Third, "as if they had been abiding and born within this our realm of England:· 7 
THORPE, supra note 8. at 3788, is the colonial counterpart to the constitutional phrase "of 
citizens." U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 2, cl. I. Both phrases identify the standard for entitlement 
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(state or colony) a set of rights ("privileges or immunities") to be 
treated as a native throughout the territories (the several states or 
the dominions). The parallel structure and linguistic similarity be-
tween charter guarantees and article IV demonstrates that the fram-
ers were influenced in their choice of language by the charter model. 
The use of charter syntax indicates that the colonial charter experi-
ence had particular relevance to the article IV provisions. 
C. Liberties, Franchises, Privileges and Immunities 
The colonial charters never defined the "liberties," "franchises," 
"privileges," or "immunities" of persons born in England. These 
terms gathered meaning from their medieval past and subsequent 
events. The words originally denoted relief from feudal obligations. 
At most, the charter guarantees promised that the King would not 
overstep his prerogative within the royal demesne. 
Developments in England and in the colonies led colonists to 
attribute new meaning to the charter provisions. They argued that 
the charters secured for the colonists the main features of the com-
mon law and the principles of English government. The colonists' 
interpretation served colonial political interests and did not always 
coincide with the British government's views. Ultimately, these 
charter-provision disputes became an integral part of the Revolu-
tion. Although the colonial view of the charter provisions was his-
torically inaccurate, their interpretation was accepted by the 
drafters of the privileges and immunities clause for the Articles of 
Confederation and the Constitution. 
1. The Original Meaning of ''Liberties," ''Franchises," 
''Privileges" and "Immunities" 
The charter provisions on "liberties, franchises and immunities" 
may have had a limited technical meaning. 20 In feudal times, land 
was not individually owned but tenurially possessed in a hierarchi-
cal relationship of obligations owing all the way to the King. 21 
to privileges and immunities in terms of the most protected class within the political frame-
work: natives of England under English rule and citizens under the Constitution. 
Finally, the charters secure these rights ''within any other of the king"s dominions," 7 
THORPE, supra note 8, at 3788, just as art. IV refers to enjoying them "in the several states.·· 
U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2, cl. I. 
20. "The words are to be taken literally, as meaning just what they were understood to 
mean in England at that time. They have nothing to do with civil liberty, self-government, or 
democracy; they were strictly legal, tenurial and financial in their application... C. AN-
DREWS, supra note 15, at 86 n. I. 
21. See generally F. MAITLAND, CONSTITUTIONAl. HISTORY OF ENGLAND 23-39 
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"Liberty" and "franchise" referred to specific relief from these obli-
gations-a surrender by the Crown to the subject of the royal power 
to exact a burden.Z2 The surrender could take the form of non exer-
cise of the power or delegation of the power to another to exact the 
obligation. 
Early "privileges" involved the purchase of relief from a tax or 
service obligation. By the end of the sixteenth century, feudalism 
had ended in England, 23 and privileges from feudal burdens could 
be generalized as privileges applicable to all persons in England. 
Therefore, the charter references to the liberties of Englishmen may 
have meant that the King's grant of rights to lands in America did 
not entail feudal obligations. 
The charter terms may have had a broader meaning if derived 
from the corporate charters of English cities. There, "liberties" and 
"franchises" referred to the powers of city government to levy tolls 
or taxes or to protect inhabitants from being subject to obligations 
such as jury duty beyond the city limits.Z4 The "liberties" of citi-
zens in town charters anteceded the more general grant of privileges 
and immunities under the Magna Carta.Z5 In this more general 
(1955) (discussing the feudal land system); H. BENNETI, LIFE ON THE ENGLISH MANOR: A 
STUDY OF PEASANT CONDITIONS 1150-1400, at 97-150 (1960). 
22. "Lastly, in our thirteenth century we learn that privileges and exceptional immuni-
ties are 'liberties' and 'franchises.' What is our definition of a liberty, a franchise? A portion 
of royal power in the hands of a subject." F. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY BOOK AND BEYOND 
43 (1897). 
23. Cj E. EGGLESTON, THE TRANSIT OF CIVILIZATION: FROM ENGLAND TO 
AMERICA IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 294, 312-13 n.18 (1959) (using 1700 as the date 
ending feudal serfdom but admitting that authorities agree serfdom ended by 1450). 
24. Know that we have granted and by our present charter have confirmed to our 
burgesses of Ipswich our borough oflpswich, with all its appurtenances and with all 
its liberties and free customs, to be held of us and our heirs by them and their heirs 
in hereditary right. 
Charter to Ipswich from King John in 1200, reprinted in C. STEPHENSON & F. MARCHAM, I 
SOURCES Of ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 96 (1972). The corporate charter was 
originally a common form of town government. See H. HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND 
PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION Of THE CITY Of NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 
1730-1870, at 13-32 (1983). When commercial groups and explorers considered colonization, 
the corporate charter was the most convenient model to set forth their operating conditions. 
See J. SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS 41-
42 (1950). The result mixed commercial company trading charters and self government as-
pects of town charters. Subsequent colonies under direct royal control continued to use doc-
uments akin to old corporate ideas. 
25. The Magna Carta was originally issued to a small group of barons but reissued many 
times by English kings subsequent to John. The class of those obtaining privileges under the 
document broadened to include all Englishmen. The grants of privileges to towns in medie-
val times shifted individual grants of privilege to communal grants. 
Besides this general debt to the doctrines underlying municipal privilege the men of 
1215 could acknowledge many detailed precedents to their demands in the borough 
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sense, the privileges, liberties, immunities, and freedoms might refer 
to all limits of the Crown's power. If so, the character of the char-
ter guarantees was largely negative. The liberties, privileges, 
franchises or immunities involved surrender rather than exercise of 
royal power. They promised no legal protection to enforce rights 
against others. That was to come from the separate grant of power 
to the company or the proprietor to make laws approximating Eng-
lish law. Further, the charter guarantees offered no more protec-
tion from the prerogative than in England. When the first charters 
were drafted, the Crown laid claim to extensive prerogative powers: 
the King's power was at its height over his own lands, the King's 
demesne, and dominions beyond the realm were considered the 
King's demesne. The Virginia Company and New England char-
ters were issued by King James I, who maintained a broad view of 
his power in England. 26 In short, the first charter provisions repu-
diated feudalism or, at most, promised that the Crown would not 
use its prerogative powers in the colonies to deprive subjects of life, 
liberty or property in ways impermissible in England. 
No grant from the King limited the power of parliament; "lib-
erties" were exemptions from royal power alone. Use of charter 
language to support the later colonial claim that parliament could 
not bind them was not based on original intent. 
2. Privileges and Immunities from Colonization to Revolution 
Developments in England and in the colonies during the century 
and a half of British rule radically affected the meaning that colo-
nists gave to the charter guarantees. The seventeenth century was a 
watershed in the struggle between the King and Parliament for legal 
control. 27 The King, controlling the judges and appointing execu-
charters of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. On mercantile questions this was 
obvious. Cap. 41 of the Charter was an amplification of the very common provi· 
sions in municipal charters concerning freedom to trade and free access to markets. 
J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 49 (1965). 
26. James asserted a theoretical absolutism but relied on precedent for exercises of 
power. See J.P. KI;NYON, THE STUART CONSTITUTION 1603-1688, at 8 (1966). 
27. See H. NENNER, BY COLOUR OF LAW: LEGAl. CULTURE AND CONSTITUTIONAl. 
POI.ITICS IN ENGJ.AND 1660-1689, at ix-xii (1977). 
It is unfortunate that an understanding of Stuart England is often confused by the 
erroneous supposition that Jaw and prerogative were opposed, that, at the beginning 
of the century, Jaw, in the person of Coke, is properly to be seen as the relentless 
adversary of the prerogative, in the person of James I . . . . It can, however, be 
argued that the seventeenth century makes greater sense, is rendered more intelligi-
ble, when the Stuarts and their parliaments are viewed in the context of a somewhat 
different constitutional struggle, a struggle which was not for the ascendancy of Jaw 
but for the ascendancy of king or Parliament, and which was at all times circum-
~cribed by law. 
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tive officers, was initially victorious, but Parliament ultimately 
gained control. Each advance of parliamentary power curbed royal 
prerogative. Therefore, if privileges and immunities were defined by 
limits on the prerogative, the privileges were expanded during the 
seventeenth century. 
Finding Parliament difficult to deal with, King Charles I at-
tempted to govern without it. The lack of finances forced the King 
to find new expedients for raising revenues, such as the ship money 
tax. 28 The courts upheld this exercise of the prerogative, 29but it was 
insufficient. Forced to reconvene Parliament to obtain new reve-
nues, Charles I was compelled to accede to measures limiting the 
prerogative, including one declaring the ship money levy illegal. 30 
The King could not impose taxes without parliamentary consent. 
Though Charles I was eventually beheaded and Oliver Crom-
well ruled as Lord Protector, the struggle between King and Parlia-
ment continued throughout the century. Despite Charles Il's 
Restoration creating the possibility of extending prerogative pow-
ers, parliamentary supremacy was assured by the "Glorious 
Revolution" of 1689 when William and Mary assumed the throne 
after deposing James II. 
The battle for legislative supremacy in England was paralleled 
by the rise of local assemblies in colonial America. Each colony's 
legislative authority was vested in the King's representative or 
grantee. The corporate charters gave lawmaking power to the cor-
poration. The proprietary grant to Lord Baltimore gave him the 
power to make laws "with the advice, assent and approbation of the 
free-men of the same province, or of the same province, or of the 
greater part of them, or of their delegates or deputies, whom WE 
Jd. at xi-xii. 
28. Writ for the Collection of Ship Money (1634) in C. STEPHENSON & F. MARCHAM, 
supra note 24, at 455-56, citing 2 HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS 257 (J. Rushworth ed. 1721). 
The King could use his prerogative power over foreign affairs by demanding ships to equip 
his foreign military ventures. Charles levied a tax rather than ships. 
29. The Question of Ship Money (1637) in C. STEPHENSON & F. MARCHAM, supra note 
24, at 458-59, citing 3 STATE TRIALS 843 f (T.B. Howell ed. 1816-26) (hereinafter STATE 
TRIALS]; and The King v. John Hampden (1638) in C. STEPHENSON & F. MARCHAM, supra, 
at 459-62, citing STATE TRIALS, supra, at 1089-145. 
30. [T]he said charge imposed upon the subject for the providing and furnishing of 
ships commonly called ship money ... , and the said writs ... and the said judg-
ment given against the said John Hampden, were and are contrary to and against 
the Jaws and statutes of this realm, the right of property, the liberty of the subjects. 
former resolutions in parliament and the Petition of Right made in the third year of 
the reign of his majesty that now is. 
Act Abolishing Ship Money (1641), reprinted in C. STEPHENSON & F. MARCHAM, supra note 
24, at 4811-12, citing 5 STATUTES OF THE REALM 116. 
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will shall be called together for the framing of laws."31 Even royal 
colonies included power in the governor and council to enact laws. 
But government required cooperation by the populace, particularly 
to support taxation. As early as 1650, the Maryland General As-
sembly contended that no tax could be raised without its consent. 32 
As a result of such insistence, grants of power to limited bodies to 
enact local laws became anachronisms. Local assemblies made law 
in most colonies by the end of the seventeenth century. 33 The 
Crown's power to control domestic colonial law was effectively re-
duced to the same veto power it retained over acts of Parliament. 34 
The autonomous local assembly transformed colonial views on 
the meaning of the charter provisions securing the liberties of En-
glishmen. Early colonists asserted that "rights liberties immunities 
priviledges and free customs" are created by English common and 
statutory law, except as altered by the laws of the Province.35 Colo-
31. 1 LAWS, supra note 17, at 3. 
32. noe Subsidies ayde Customes taxes or impositions shaH hereafter bee layde as-
sessed, Ieavyed or imposed upon the freemen of this Province or on theire Merchan-
dize Goods or Chattles without the Consent and Approbation of the freemen of this 
Province their Deputyes or the Major parte of them, first had and declared in a 
Genera11 Assembly of this Province. 
I ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 302 (W. Browne ed. 1883). 
33. M. KAMMEN, DEPUTYES & LIBERTIES: THE ORIGINS OF REPRESENTATIVE GOV-
ERNMENT IN COLONIAL AMERICA 57-58 (1969). 
34. The King's or proprietor's colonial representative held a legislative veto power. The 
Board of Trade, Lord's Committee and Privy Council aU had power to review colonial legis-
lation, to disa1Iow colonial laws and thereby to limit the power of local assemblies. See J. 
SMITH, supra note 24; G. WASHBURNE, IMPERIAL CONTROL OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE IN THE THIRTEEN AMERICAN COLONIES 1684-1776 (1923). The power was not 
exercised against every departure from English practice, but laws which interfered with Eng-
lish colonial policy were inevitably stricken. The royal governor and the English Board of 
Trade could veto an unwise although not conflicting law. In the eighteenth century, about 
five percent of colonial laws were disa1Iowed. J. BLUM, THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 50 
(1968). See A. BASYE, THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS OF TRADE AND PLANTATIONS, 1748-
1782 (1925); 0. DICKERSON, AMERICAN COLONIAL GOVERNMENT, 1699-1765 (1912); L. 
LABOREE, ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA; A STUDY OF THE BRITISH COLONIAL SYS-
TEM BEFORE 1783 (1930); E. RUSSELL, REVIEW OF AMERICAN COLONIAL LEGISLATION BY 
THE KING IN CouNCIL (1915). In the eighteenth century, a permitted law could still be 
appealed to the Privy Council as conflicting with English law. These appeals, although ex-
tremely rare, were precedents for the American judicial review doctrine. More commonly, 
claims were made in American Courts of common law rights, and a limited class of such 
cases could raise claims in the Privy Council that American court procedures violated rights 
of Englishmen. See G. WASHBURNE, supra, at 184-89 (validity of colonial enactments dis-
cussed; Withrop v. Lechmere only case holding colonial enactment void; supplanted by Clark 
v. Tousey). 
35. A statute was proposed in the Maryland General Assembly in 1639, yet never 
passed the house: 
Be it Enacted By the Lord Proprietarie of this Province of and with the advice and 
approbation of the freemen of the same that aU the Inhabitants of this Province 
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nial judges, appointed by the Crown or its local governors, turned 
to English common law as a familiar source of precedent. Grants of 
lawmaking power required some conformity to the common law. 
Almost every governing document granted to the proprietor, cor-
poration, governor or council the power to make laws to govern the 
settlers "so always as the said statutes, laws, and ordinances may be 
as near as conveniently may be, agreeable to the form of the laws, 
statutes government or policy of England."36 While no one be-
lieved that English common law and parliamentary enactments 
would categorically apply in America, the degree of their applicabil-
ity in the colonies was a complex issue.37 Nevertheless, English law 
to some extent applied until altered by local authorities. The char-
ter language possibly guaranteed that the limits of the prerogative 
would be bounded by the law: the requirement that the government 
conform to English law created an expectation of the law's charac-
ter which became an assertible right. The charter language of indi-
vidual right used the words "privilege, franchise, liberties, or 
immunities." Colonists understood those terms to incorporate Eng-
lish law. 
being Christians (Slaves excepted) Shall have and enjoy all such rights liberties im-
munities privileages and free customs within this Province as any naturall born 
subject of England hath or ought to have or enjoy in the realm of England by force 
or vertue of the common law or Statute Law of England (saveing in such Cases as 
the same are or may be altered or changed by the Laws and ordinances of this 
Province). 
And Shall not be imprisoned nor disseissed or dispossessed of their freehold 
goods or Chattels or be out Lawed Exiled or otherwise destroyed fore judged or 
punished then according to the Laws of this province saveing to the Lord 
proprietarie and his heirs all his rights and prerogatives by reason of his domination 
and Seigniory over this Province and the people of the same. 
I ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, supra note 32, at 41. 
The Secretary noted that a large number of bills, including this one, were never read nor 
passed the house, without explanation for the failure. Nevertheless, the general Bill for the 
Government of the Province that did pass in 1639 specified: "The Inhabitants of this Prov-
ince shall have all their rights and liberties according to the great Charter of England." !d. at 
83. 
36. W. SWINDLER, supra note 10, at 65-66. 
37. The reception of the common law varied in territories acquired by conquering a 
Christian king-where the existing law remained until replaced by positive exercises of the 
prerogative-and territories acquired by conquest of an infidel-where the King's law was 
immediately applicable. Acquisition of territory by settlement did not fit either category. J. 
SMITH, supra note 24, at 467. Colonial judges looked to English common law but often 
lacked legal training and access to English precedents. Local tailoring was unlikely to be 
reviewed given the small number of cases reviewed by English courts. The applicability of 
English statutes forced consideration of the type of parliamentary act (whether affirming 
common law or making new law); the statutory scope (whether general or particular); the 
date of enactment (whether prior to or after settlement); and the type of colony (proprietary, 
charter, or royal). 
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If the charter terms retained their meaning as limiting royal 
power, the common law was not intrinsically a privilege or immu-
nity of a citizen but rather marked the prerogative's limit. If the 
laws and ordinances of the colony departed from the common law, 
such self government was no charter violation. Any threat to the 
privileges or immunities of the colony's people came only if the 
King or his grantee attempted to alter the common law by preroga-
tive. By the American Revolution, the colonists had asserted the 
right to English statutory and common law appropriate for colonial 
circumstances. 
A selective "right" to desired laws without being bound by un-
desired ones originated in the negative character of "privileges and 
immunities." English law defined the extent of the prerogative in 
England and was thus a "privilege or immunity" of an Englishman. 
The King's colonial prerogative was no greater than in England, but 
the law applicable to colonists beyond the prerogative could be lo-
cally derived. Thus, only the English common law and statutes 
found desirable by the colonists were colonial "privileges"; the rest 
were locally defined. 
England acknowledged that the colonists should be treated as 
British subjects. 38 As Parliament prevailed as the primary govern-
mental force, the right of British subjects was to have parliamentary 
law apply through proper procedures. Colonists responded that lo-
cal assemblies in the colonies were the equivalent of Parliament. 
Having identified charter guarantees with English law, the colonists 
contended that the charters required conformity with the principles 
of English government. 39 They claimed that the nature of English 
38. For the Crown, an interpretation of "privileges, liberties and immunities" as a grant 
of government protection of individual rights supported the exercise of royal power over the 
governance of the colony. At this early date, the Crown controlled foreign relations. The 
rights and duties of English subjects in foreign lands came within the King's prerogative. 
Thus, the clause could mean that the colonist was entitled to appeal to the King, not for any 
specific legal right, but for protection like any Englishman in a foreign land. The King de-
cided what kind of protection should be afforded. See J. SMITH, supra note 24, at 42, 74-75, 
140-45. This interpretation of the clause strengthened the King's claim to control the colo-
nial government. Even if the clause secured substantive legal rights to colonists, it provided 
for royal supervision of colonial affairs. 
39. This declaration [the liberties and immunities clause of the Connecticut char-
ter] and confirmation denotes and imports (as is conceived) that all those general 
and essential rights which the free and natural subjects in the mother country are 
possessed of and vested with by virtue of the main, leading, and fundamental princi-
ples of the common law or constitution of the realm, the King's subjects in the said 
colony of Connecticut shall have and enjoy. 
Fitch, Reasons Why the British Colonies In America Should Not Be Charged With Illtemal 
Taxes (1764), reprinted in B. BAILYN, PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750-
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subjects' rights was to be governed by their own representatives, 
that Americans had no representation in Parliament, and that con-
sequently, laws made by Parliament for the colonies violated their 
rights. Further, restrictive laws affecting the colonies differently 
than England were challenged as violations of English liberties. 
On May 30, 1765, the Virginia House of Burgesses claimed that 
the Stamp Act violated the rights of Englishmen-rights both in-
herent in subjects of the King and granted specifically by charter.40 
The "rights" claimed were limits on government. The nature of 
"privileges and immunities" by now, however, had clearly changed 
from limits on the prerogative to limits on any exercise of power by 
any sector of English government. 
On October 14, 1774, the First Continental Congress issued a 
Declaration and Resolves that stated an even broader view of the 
rights of Americans, claiming rights by the law of nature as well as 
under the principles of the English Constitution and the colonial 
1776, at 386, 390 (1965) (fundamental principle is that laws cannot be made or abrogated 
without popular consent). 
40. Resolved, That the first adventurers and settlers of this His Majesty's Colony 
and Dominion of Virginia brought with them, and transmitted to their posterity, 
and all other His Majesty's subjects since inhabiting in this His Majesty's said Col-
ony, all the liberties, privileges, franchises, and immunities that have at any time 
been held, enjoyed, and possessed, by the people of Great Britain. 
Resolved, That by two royal charters, granted by King James the First, the colo-
nists aforesaid are declared entitled to all liberties, privileges, and immunities of 
denizens and natural subjects, to all intents and purposes, as if they have been abid-
ing and born within the realm of England. 
Resolved, That the taxation of the people by themselves, or by persons chosen by 
themselves to represent them, who can only know what taxes the people are able to 
bear, or the easiest method of raising them, and must themselves be affected by 
every tax laid on the people, is the only security against a burthensome taxation, 
and the distinguishing characteristick of British freedom, without which the ancient 
constitution cannot exist. 
Resolved, That his Majesty's liege people of this his most ancient and loyal Col-
ony have without interruption enjoyed the inestimable right of being governed by 
such laws, respecting their internal polity and taxation, as are derived from their 
own consent, with the approbation of their sovereign, or his substitute; and that the 
same hath never been forfeited or yielded up, but hath been constantly recognized 
by the kings and people of Great Britain. 
Resolved therefore, That the General Assembly of this Colony have the only and 
sole exclusive right and power to lay taxes and impositions upon the inhabitants of 
this Colony, and that every attempt to vest such power in any person or persons 
whatsoever other than the General Assembly aforesaid has a manifest tendency to 
destroy British as well as American freedom .... 
SOURCES & DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1764-1788 AND THE 
FORMATION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 17-18 (S. Morison ed. 1929) [hereinafter 
SOURCES] citing JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES OF VIRGINIA, 1761-65 (J. Ken-
nedy ed. 1907) (last resolution rescinded although published in other colonies as though 
passed). 
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charters.41 In article 5 they claimed the right to the common law, 
including trial by jury; in article 6 the Congress asserted the colo-
nists' right to the English statutes which they found applicable to 
their own situation; and in article 7 they asserted the right to the 
41. That the inhabitants of the English Colonies in North America, by the immuta-
ble laws of nature, the principles of the English Constitution, and the several char-
ters or compacts, have the following rights: 
1. That they are entitled to life, liberty, and property, and they have never 
ceded to any sovereign power whatever, a right to dispose of either without their 
consent. 
2. That our ancestors, who first settled these colonies, were at the time of their 
emigration from the mother country, entitled to all the rights, liberties, and immu-
nities of free and natural-born subjects within the realm of England. 
3. That by such emigration they by no means forfeited, surrendered, or lost 
any of those rights, but that they were, and their descendants now are entitled to the 
exercise and enjoyment of all such of them, as their local and other circumstances 
enable them to exercise and enjoy. 
4. That the foundation of English liberty, and of all free government, is a right 
in the people to participate in their legislative council: and as the English colonists 
are not represented, and from their local and other circumstances, cannot properly 
be represented in the British Parliament, they are entitled to a free and exclusive 
power of legislation in their several provincial legislatures, where their right of rep-
resentation can alone be preserved, in all cases of taxation and internal polity, sub-
ject only to the negative of their sovereign, in such manner as has been heretofore 
used and accustomed. But, from the necessity of the case, and a regard to the 
mutual interest of both countries, we cheerfully consent to the operation of such 
Acts of the British Parliament, as are bona fide restrained to the regulation of our 
external commerce, for the purpose of securing the commercial advantages of the 
whole empire to the mother country, and the commercial benefits of its respective 
members; excluding every idea of taxation, internal or external, for raising a reve-
nue on the subjects in America without their consent. 
5. That the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and 
more especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of 
the vicinage, according to the course of that law. 
6. That they are entitled to the benefit of such of the English statutes, as ex-
isted at the time of their colonization; and which they have, by experience, respec-
tively found to be applicable to their several local and other circumstances. 
7. That these, His Majesty's Colonies, are likewise entitled to all the immuni-
ties and privileges granted and confirmed to them by royal charters, or secured by 
their several codes of provincial laws. 
8. That they have a right to peaceably assemble, consider of their grievances, 
and petition the king; and that all prosecutions, prohibitory proclamations, and 
commitments for the same, are illegal. 
9. That the keeping a standing army in these colonies, in times of peace, with-
out the consent of the legislature of that colony in which such army is kept, is 
against law. 
10. It is indispensably necessary to good government, and rendered essential 
by the English Constitution, that the constituent branches of the legislature be ren-
dered independent of each other; that, therefore, the exercise of legislative power in 
several colonies, by a council appointed during pleasure, by the Crown, is unconsti-
tutional, dangerous, and destructive to the freedom of American legislation. 
All and each of which the aforesaid deputies, in behalf of themselves, and their 
constituents, do claim, demand, and insist on, as their indubitable rights and liber-
ties; which cannot be legally taken from them, altered or abridged by any power 
whatever, without their own consent, by their representatives in their several pro-
vincial legislatures. 
SOURCES, supra note 40, at 119-21. 
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"privileges and immunities" granted by the charters or secured by 
provincial codes. The separate article for "privileges and immuni-
ties" suggests that colonists still regarded the phrase as applicable 
only to limits on government authority and not as establishing posi-
tive law as in the common law, the statutes or provincial codes. 
Nevertheless, the Declaration indicates that the charter guarantees 
merely confirmed rights applicable to the colonists from the princi-
ples of English government which in turn reflected natural law. 
While they were still subjects of the King, the colonists rested their 
claims primarily on rights identified within the existing English 
legal system-the common law, the English statute, and the charter 
provision or provincial code. Natural law was a supplementary ba-
sis for the claim of a "privilege or immunity" found in existing legal 
structures. 
On the eve of the American Revolution, the "liberties," 
"franchises," "privileges," and "immunities" in colonial charters 
had developed new meanings. They were identified with the basic 
principles the colonists found in English government, especially the 
political principle of representative government. 
D. The Rights of Englishmen in Other Dominions of the King 
One of the basic principles of English government was the com-
mon status of all subjects of the King, confirmed in Calvin's Case. 
There was little discussion in the polemical writings on the eve of 
the Revolution of the rights of colonists in other dominions of the 
King. That was not in contention. Nevertheless, the charter provi-
sions invoked to resist England had their clearest application to in-
tercolonial rights. 
Historians have viewed the charter phrases as a reference to the 
transportation of rights: colonists carry with them to the new world 
and transmit to their children the same "privileges, franchises, lib-
erties and immunities" as had they remained in England.42 But the 
crucial liberty claimed in 1776 was the right to be bound only by 
laws to which the colonists had consented through their representa-
tive. The law varied from colony to colony; no one thought colo-
nists took the law of their colony with them when leaving its 
jurisdiction. The early Virginia and Massachusetts charters re-
ferred to liberties as if the colonists had been "abiding and born 
within this kingdom of England" but had added "or any other of 
42. See, e.g., C. ANDREWS, supra note 15; A. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNY-
MEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 15-23 (1968). 
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our Dominions." Similar clauses in later charters made no refer-
ence to the privileges of persons abiding in England but only to 
privileges or immunities as if born in England. These privileges 
were secured not just in the province for which the charter was 
given but in "any of our dominions." Consequently, this language 
required the determination of the rights of an Englishman in the 
other dominions of the King. 
The content of the guarantees might be deduced from the rights 
a colonist from one colony was actually afforded in a second colony. 
Since the natives of the second colony presumably received their 
charter liberties, the limits of the charter guarantee may be derived 
from permissible discrimination against persons from other colo-
nies. Further, since the colonial charters and the privileges and im-
munities clause of both the Articles of Confederation and the 
Constitution specify that privileges and immunities apply across 
boundary lines, the colonists relied on the experience of in-
tercolonial recognition of British nationality to understand their 
rights. Curiously, few studies have traced the development of in-
tercolonial rights, yet this issue is important for understanding the 
background of the Constitution. 
1. Intercolonial Movement 
Immigration from England and intercolonial migration oc-
curred throughout the colonial period. The common allegiance to 
the King meant that the colonist could travel to England or other 
colonies as freely as the English subject who lived in England. The 
right to travel was an established English liberty since the Magna 
Carta.43 Even the Navigation Acts of 1660 restricting American 
trade treated colonial and English shipping alike, excluding only 
alien ship trade. 44 
The English subject's right to travel, however, was restricted by 
concern for religion, the protection of creditors, and the provision 
of welfare. During early English settlement, a religious oath re-
quirement restricted emigration from England. Within the colo-
nies, local creditors feared servants and debtors would leave the 
colony to escape their obligations. Even where individuals could 
freely leave a community, they might be excluded from other com-
43. A. HOWARD, supra note 42, at 214. The Magna Carta guarantee protecting free-
dom of movement of foreign merchants became a similar guarantee for natives. J.C. HOLT, 
supra note 25, at 11-12. 
44. 7 STATUTES AT LARGE 452-60 (D. Pickering ed. 1763). An Act for the encouraging 
and increasing of shipping and navigation. W. SWINDLER, supra note 10, at 116-24. 
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munities for religious or poverty reasons. One important question 
for investigation is the extent to which freedom of movement ex-
isted when the Revolution began. 
The feudal system bound the serf to the lord's land. With the 
demise of the feudal system, people could move around the English 
countryside in search of work. English "poor laws," however, re-
quired an individual's parish to provide support until the individual 
obtained "settlement" in another location.45 The power of local ju-
risdictions to return persons to the parish where they had settled 
helped confine individuals to their birth area. Compared to feudal-
ism, there was considerable freedom of movement, but restrictions 
continued to confine. 
The Act of Settlement discouraged migration within England 
but had a less significant impact on migration to the colonies. The 
need for labor made the colonies eager to receive people rather than 
to erect local barriers to avoid potential liability. The costs of trans-
atlantic travel assured that the passenger had money and would be 
welcomed, or could fill needs for labor so that an indenture could be 
made. The eagerness for new workers led to another movement re-
striction: some locations in England required registration of inden-
tures before the emigrant left the country as a means of 
discouraging kidnapping. 46 
Once in the colonies, travel was restricted by various "pass 
laws" adopted to prevent servants from escaping from service and 
to enable masters to enforce the indenture term.47 Early laws re-
quired all persons who traveled to obtain a pass.48 These statutes 
45. The Settlement Act of 1662 provided: 
that any newcomer to a parish could be returned within 40 days to the parish where 
he was last legally settled, whether or not he applied for relief or was likely to do so. 
To avoid such expulsion, the individual could provide security or pay an exorbitant 
rent (£10), far beyond the ability of most (90%) of the population. The result was 
the legal restriction of all people without substantial wealth or property to the area 
in which they were born. 
P. DODYK, M. SOVERN, C. BERGER, W. YOUNG, & M. PAULSON, LAW AND POVERTY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 112 (1969). 
46. D. GALENSON, WHITE SERVITUDE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 183-84 (1981) (Bristol 
registrations). 
47. !d. at 8, citing A. SMITH, COLONISTS IN BONDAGE: WHITE SERVITUDE AND CON· 
VICT LABOR IN AMERICA 1607-1776, at 264-70 (1947). 
48. MARYLAND LAWS, 1715, Ch. XIX: "'An ACT prohibiting all masters of ships or 
vessels, or any other person, from transporting or conveying away any person or persons out 
of this province without passes."' The original source for this Jaw was MARYLAND LAws, 
1704, Ch. XXII (subsequent enactments, e.g. MARYLAND LAws, 1753, Ch. IX, apply only to 
servants and slaves). 
LAws OF VIRGINIA, SEPT. 1632, Act LVI: "'It is ordered, That no person or persons shall 
depart out of this colony to inhabite or abide within any other plantations, of New-England 
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assured creditors that their debtors would not leave the province 
without giving security to assure debt payment. Nevertheless, by 
the middle of the eighteenth century, the colonial laws restricted 
only those persons bound to service from emigration. 
The colonial welcome for the indentured servant did not always 
extend to that person beyond the term of indenture. The unem-
ployed and unemployable began to pose community problems. The 
colonies, following England, adopted settlement laws for local juris-
dictions to exclude nonresidents in order to prevent welfare 
claims.49 The statutes did not restrict travel but prevented indigents 
from staying in a new town. The trader with resources was unaf-
fected by these laws which reflected community anxiety to avoid 
welfare burdens for the poor. 
Religious intolerance posed another restriction on travel. Dur-
ing religious strife in England, emigrants took an oath of loyalty to 
the King before leaving England. The structure of the oath could 
not conscientiously be followed by certain sects; therefore, religion 
curbed English migration and limited immigration to the colonies. 
Individuals not conforming to the dominant religion might be re-
fused settlement rights and driven from the area. The "poor" laws 
and religious intolerance restrictions, while fencing people out, for 
the most part did not prevent people from leaving. With so much 
unsettled territory, a continued stream of migration flowed from 
one colony to another, especially to the west. 50 
The Rhode Island charter in 1663 entitled inhabitants of Rhode 
Island towns to free movement for lawful purposes through any 
other of the king's dominions. 51 Even without specific charter as-
surances, freedom of movement was common in practice. 52 Colo-
or elsewhere, unlesse he obteyne a lycense or passe for his departure under the Governor's 
hand." See LAWS OF VIRGINIA, MARCH 1643, Act. II (prohibiting persons from transport-
ing persons from the colony without a pass and requiring the posting of security for debts as a 
condition of getting the pass); LAWS OF VIRGINIA, MARCH 1657, Act XII (prohibiting mas-
ters of vessels from transporting any person out of the colony without a pass); LAws OF 
VIRGINIA, MARCH 1658, Act LXVIII (requiring a pass to be obtained to move to the Chesa-
peake Bay). 
49. S. Mencher, POOR LAW TO POVERTY PROGRAM 39-41 (1967); W. TRATINER, A 
HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 20-23 (3d ed. 1984). 
50. On the heavy amount of emigration among freedmen in the Chesapeake, see Carr & 
Menard, Immigration and Opportunity: The Freedman in Early Colonial Maryland, in THE 
CHESAPEAKE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY: EssAYS ON ANGLO-AMERICAN SOCIETY 
206, 236 (T. Tate & D. Ammerman eds. 1979) [hereinafter CHESAPEAKE]. 
51. W. CRAVEN, supra note 12, at 54-55; See THORPE, supra note 8, at 3212-13. 
52. SeeP. FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION 31 (1981). (Under British rule Ameri-
can colonists guaranteed freedom of movement by virtue of imperial citizenship.). 
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nial law did not keep individuals in their home area unless fleeing 
from a service obligation. Although the unemployed and unproper-
tied migrant might be excluded from living in new areas, the exclu-
sion related to the economic conditions of each area and was not 
usually colony wide. 
2. Acquisition of Citizenship by Residence 
A second question for further study is the extent to which colo-
nists could acquire the rights of natives of another province by re-
siding there. To the British, the colonies were dependent 
governments. A Virginia colonist was not a citizen of an independ-
ent state but an English subject inhabiting Virginia. Local assem-
blies could exercise delegated authority to proscribe local 
community rules, but community membership was a consequence 
of living there. 
"Foreigners" were distinguished from British natives of other 
colonies. New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, North Carolina and Del-
aware excluded "foreigners" from voting by statute, and other colo-
nies customarily excluded non-British subjects.53 
A number of provinces also established voting residence require-
ments although such laws did not exist in England. "In Georgia 
and North Carolina, a six month minimum was established, in 
South Carolina, one year, while in Pennsylvania and Delaware it 
was two years."54 However, New York and Virginia had no resi-
dence requirement. An individual moving there from another prov-
ince immediately became a full community member entitled to vote 
for the legislature if he met all the other voting requirements. 55 
In some colonies, residence requirements excluded newcomers 
from opportunities available to natives. As a native population de-
veloped, the colonists resisted the imposition of English officials. 
The Crown retained the power to appoint colonial officials and gen-
erally reserved those positions as rewards for English supporters. 
Concerned that outsiders would come to the colony to reap its prof-
its without becoming part of its life, colonists imposed durational 
residency requirements for holding public offices. Local ordinances 
excluded newcomers from offices except by immediate commission 
from the Crown. 56 
53. R. DINKIN, VOTING IN PROVINCIAL AMERICA: A STUDY OF ELECTIONS IN THE 
THIRTEEN COLONIES, 1689-1776, at 34 (1977). 
54. !d. at 35. 
55. /d. 
56. XIX ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, supra note 32, at 100-01; XXVI ARCHIVES OF 
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Other barriers to community membership existed for an immi-
grating nonresident. Community "poor laws" within a colony 
could prevent an individual from settling there. The "poor law" 
concept of settlement could create durational residency require-
ments for the exercise of other rights. Until a community accepted 
an individual, real residence was not established. Acceptance into a 
community was a local authority rather than colonial issue because 
support obligations were local. One achieving "settlement" in an 
area was entitled to civil and political rights available to long-time 
residents. 
Aside from these restrictions, 57 the colonial concern focused on 
inclusion rather than exclusion. Colonies encouraged immigration 
by assuring foreigners of property and contract rights. They held 
out the promise of colonial law naturalization, but England would 
never accept colonial naturalization as being equivalent to parlia-
mentary naturalization. Under English law, an alien naturalized 
under Massachusetts law was an alien and treated as one through-
out English dominions. Indeed, one of the charges against King 
George in the Declaration of Independence was that "He has en-
deavored to prevent the population of these states; for that purpose 
obstructing the laws for naturalization of foreigners; refusing to 
pass others to encourage their migrations hither & raising the con-
ditions of new appropriations of lands."58 
English law was concerned only with colonial attempts to natu-
ralize foreigners. Individuals born in England or a colony were not 
naturalized because they were already English subjects. Thus, 
although colonies enacted special naturalization procedures to as-
sure foreigners of rights held by natives, no such procedure applied 
to the King's colonial subjects. The Crown wanted to facilitate ac-
ceptance. If colonists had restricted English immigration, England 
would have disallowed their laws. Thus, in practice, a Virginian 
became a New Yorker simply by moving there and waiting to be-
come a full community member. 
MARYLAND, id. at 429-30. See also Jordan, Political Stability and the Emergence of a Native 
Elite in Maryland, in CHESAPEAKE, supra note 50, at 243, 271-72; Shammas, English-Bam 
and Creole Elites in Tum-of-the-Celltury Virginia, in CHESAPEAKE, id. at 274, 291-92 (similar 
Virginia laws). 
57. Religious theocracy in New England during the seventeenth century also precluded 
a stranger from becoming a true community member-a church member. It played a lesser 
role in excluding residents during the eighteenth century as a more secular political structure 
developed. 
58. The Declaration of Independence para. 10 (U.S. 1776). 
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3. Nondiscrimination against Nonresidents 
The colonist was also protected against discrimination when vis-
iting or trading in a colony. The colonist who visited England or 
had property interests there received the same legal treatment as 
Englishmen. Unlike aliens, colonists retained rights to own real 
property and to file suit in English courts. Hamilton wrote in The 
Federalist Papers on the need for a single nation and cited the colo-
nial free trade to buttress his point. States in isolation would pursue 
different commercial policies and cause: 
distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which would beget dis-
content. The habits of intercourse, on the basis of equal privi-
leges, to which we have been accustomed since the earliest 
settlement of the country would give a keener edge to those 
causes of discontent than they would naturally have independent 
of this circumstance. 59 
The English allegiance preventing the colonist from being 
treated as an alien in other colonies did not prohibit laws distin-
guishing between residents and nonresidents. The nonresident 
posed greater colonial control problems; consequently, legislation 
dealt with the possibility that a nonresident would not remain in the 
colony. Maryland had different rules for attachment of resident 
and nonresident property.60 Residents were permitted to sue with-
out an attorney, while nonresidents were required to have one.61 
Special procedures were enacted for nonresidents to acknowledge 
conveyances. 62 These regulations were directed at locating and as-
serting jurisdiction over the nonresident and did not reflect antago-
nism toward the nonresident status. 
An individual's right to treatment within another colony as a 
common subject of the King did not prohibit all restrictive in-
tercolonial trade law. The Navigation Acts prevented colonists 
from trading specified goods directly with foreign nations, requiring 
goods to be shipped first to England. Colonies occasionally barred 
importation of goods from other colonies. For example, in 1715 
Maryland prohibited the importation of bread, beer, flour, malt, 
wheat or other grain or tobacco from Pennsylvania or any other 
59. THE FEDERALIST No. 7. at 62-63 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (background 
of intercolonial freedom of trade would make trade barriers e~tablished by separate states 
difficult to tolerate: "We should be ready to denominate injuries those things which were in 
reality the justifiable acts of independent sovereignties consulting a distinct interest.·· !d.). 
60. MARY! AND LAWS. 1715. ch. 40. § 2-3. 
61. MARYLAND LAWS. 1716. ch. 20. 
62. MARYI AND LAWS. 1776, ch. 14, § 4. 
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colony. 63 Trade barriers assisted local producers at the expense of 
other colonies, but the laws turned on the goods' location and not 
the trader's residence. Colonial power to enact protectionist legisla-
tion was nonetheless limited, because England would not tolerate 
commercial interference affecting its trade. 64 
II. THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 
In the fourth article of the Confederation, it is declared "that the 
free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and 
fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges 
and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the peo-
ple of each State shall, in every other, enjoy all the privileges of 
trade and commerce," etc. There is a confusion oflanguage here 
which is remarkable. Why the terms free inhabitants are used in 
one part of the article, free citizens in another, and people in an-
other; or what was meant by superadding to "all privileges and 
immunities of free citizens," "all the privileges of trade and com-
merce," cannot easily be determined.65 
Prior to declaring independence, each colony regarded itself as a 
separate dominion headed by a common King. Under the various 
charters, the King had promised colonial subjects entitlement to the 
same liberties, privileges, franchises, and immunities in every other 
colony as if born in England or that colony. As British subjects, 
colonists had rights to travel, to become members of another colony 
by moving there, and to be free of discrimination in trade, property 
ownership and other legal rights in other colonies. However in-
dependent, colonial governments were required to recognize their 
common link with other colonies through the King. Discrimination 
against nonresidents paled in comparison to restrictions on foreign-
ers or to the past. 
Independence broke the link with the King and undercut the 
requirement that persons from other colonies be treated as common 
subjects, not aliens. Unless some provision was made, each state 
could discriminate freely against people from other states. Thus, 
the privileges and immunities clause of the Articles of Confedera-
tion grew out of the need to restore the common nationality and 
intercolonial rights that existed before independence. 
63. THE LAWS OF THE PROVINCE OF MARYLAND 82-83 (E. Jones ed. 1718). 
64. See C. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL BACKGROUND 01' THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
50 (1931). 
65. THil FF.DERAI.IST No. 42, at 270 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
HeinOnline -- 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 818 1986-1987
818 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:794 
A. Dickinson's Initial Proposal 
During the move toward independence, the Continental Con-
gress established two committees: the first was to compile a state-
ment, drafted by Thomas Jefferson, explaining the reasons for the 
breach with the mother country, and the second was to establish a 
governmental framework. The latter committee reported a draft of 
articles of confederation, largely by John Dickinson of Penn-
sylvania, on July 12, 1776. Dickinson proposed two articles to ad-
dress potential discrimination against citizens of other states: 
Article VI: The Inhabitants of each Colony shall henceforth 
always enjoy the same Rights, Liberties, Privileges, Immunities 
and Advantages, in the other Colonies, which the said Inhabit-
ants now have, in all Cases whatever, except in those provided 
for by the next following Article. 
Article VII: The Inhabitants of each Colony shall enjoy all 
the Rights, Liberties, Privileges, Immunities and Advantages, in 
Trade, Navigation and Commerce in any other Colony, and in 
going to and from the same from and to any Part of the World, 
which the Natives of such Colony enjoy. 66 
Article VI on its face attempted to preserve the prerevolutionary 
intercolonial privilege of the King's subjects under the new govern-
ment. Indeed, Dickinson used "inhabitants of each colony." Arti-
cle VII used a different mechanism to protect intercolonial rights of 
movement and commerce. Instead of preserving the status quo, it 
used the colonial charter technique of measuring intercolonial 
rights by the rights of natives of the colony. Both provisions used 
positive law standards without reference to natural law principles. 
The August 1776 revised draft articles omitted both provi-
sions. 67 No record of any discussion of the omission exists, but the 
flaws of article VI may have been the cause. It prevented any alter-
ation of noncommercial state law affecting residents of other states, 
even if nondiscriminatory against nonresidents. Article VII may 
have been dropped because it was tied to Article VI as an exception. 
The Dickinson draft raised the intercolonial rights issue under 
Crown experience. The articles, although omitted, addressed a 
state's obligations to persons from another state. The rejection of 
the first draft's inartful approach simply postponed resolution. 
B. Committee Draft Proposals 
The Revolutionary War pushed aside the Articles of Confedera-
66. 5 JoURNALS, supra note I, at 547 (W. Forded. 1906). 
67. /d. at 676. 
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tion consideration. A year later, the Continental Congress was still 
debating it. In November 1777, with many delegates away, a com-
mittee considered new articles to be added to the draft. One article 
elaborated on the Dickinson draft. Several forms of the proposed 
committee article have survived. 68 One early draft [hereinafter 
Draft A] provided that: 
5. And for the more certain preservation of friendship and 
mutual intercourse between the people of the different States in 
this Union, the Citizens of every State, going to reside in another 
State, Shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges of the natu-
ral born free Citizens of the State to which they go to reside; and 
the people of each State Shall have free egress and regress for 
their persons and property to and from every other State, with-
out hinderance, molestation or imposition of any kind. Pro-
vided, that if Merchandize of any sort be imported for the 
purposes of traffick within any State, that the person So import-
ing Shall be liable to the Same imposts and duties as the people of 
the State are by law liable to where Such importations are made, 
and none other. And provided also that the benefit of this Arti-
cle Shall extend to the property of the United States, and of any 
particular State, in the Same manner as to the property of an 
Individual in any State. 
The first clause of this draft sets forth the privilege of becoming 
a citizen of a second state by moving to it. The second clause 
secures the right of free travel and residence. The broad protection 
of movement is limited only by taxation of goods imported for trade 
on the same basis that residents must pay. 
The final committee draft also drew on another early draft 
[hereinafter Draft B].69 
And the better to secure and perpetuate mutual Friendship 
and Intercourse between the People of the different States in this 
Union, Agreed "that, The free Inhabitants of each of these 
States, Paupers Vagabonds and fugitives excepted, shall be enti-
tled to all Priviledges and Immunities of free Citizens in all and 
ever~ of said the respective States (saving to the Inhabitants of 
the respective States the Admission of their 01~n Inhabitants and 
the Sole Management of their own municipal Affairs). And the 
People of each State shall have free Ingress and Egress for their 
Persons and Property to and from every other State, to trade and 
traffick, without any Hindrance or Imposition of any Kind what-
soever, provided that if any Merchandise or Commodity be im-
ported into any State for the purpose of Traffick therein, the 
Person so importing shall be liable to the same Imposts and Du-
68. 9 JOURNAI.S, supra note 1, at 888 (W. Ford ed. 1907) (footnotes omitted). 
69. !d. (Overstruck text indicates original draft deletion.) 
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ties as the People of the State are by Law liable to where such 
Importations are made and none other, provided also that the 
Benefit of this Article shall Extend to the property of the United 
States and of any particular State in the same Manner as to the 
property of an Individual. 
The sense of Draft B is less clear than Draft A. The first sen-
tence appears to assure inhabitants of one state the privileges and 
immunities of free citizens in other states, whether to reside, trade 
or visit. The exception for paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives sug-
gests that the drafters focused on the rights of persons attempting to 
change residence, for members of these groups could be returned to 
their place of origin. The deletion of the clause that reserved to 
state inhabitants control over the admission of inhabitants and the 
management of municipal affairs could signify the drafters' rejec-
tion of state power. More likely, the drafters' limit of the rights of 
ingress and egress to travel for trade and traffic was designed to 
allow states to exclude persons who wished to change residence or 
to exercise non-trade or traffic rights. The draft secured citizenship 
by change of residence for residents and secured the privileges and 
immunities affiliated with trade and commerce for nonresidents. 
The two drafts were merged by the Committee into a new draft 
submitted to Congress:70 
5. And [the better to secure and perpetuate mutual] friend-
ship and intercourse between the people of the different States in 
this Union, the Inhabitants of every State [Paupers Vagabonds 
and fugitives from Justice excepted] going to reside in another 
State shall be entitled to all the rights and priviledges of the natu-
ral born free Citizens of the State to which they go to reside: And 
the people of each State shall have free [Ingress and Egress] for 
their persons and property to and from every other state without 
hinderance, or imposition of any kind, Provided that if Merchan-
dise be imported [into any State] for purpose of trafficking 
therein, the person so importing shall be liable to the same im-
posts and duties as the people of the State are by law liable to 
where such importations are made, and none other, And pro-
vided also that the benefit of this article shall extend to the prop-
erty of the United States, and of any particular State, in the same 
manner as to the property of an Individual. 
This second draft article had the same clarity of Draft A that 
the "rights and privileges" of "natural born free citizens" were se-
cured only for inhabitants of a state who went to a second state to 
reside. However, the Draft A language had been too inclusive. 
"Paupers, vagabonds and fugitives" were frequently forced under 
70. ld. at 889. (Words in brackets show insertions by James Duane or Richard Law.) 
HeinOnline -- 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 821 1986-1987
1987] PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 821 
colonial laws to return to their place of origin. As persons subject 
to expulsion, they were not entitled to the privileges and immunities 
of free citizens. Thus, the committee adopted the Draft B exemp-
tion language. With the exclusion of paupers, vagabonds and fugi-
tives from the right to acquire citizenship in another state, most 
serious state objections were eliminated. 
The drafters left no reason for choosing "inhabitant" (Draft B) 
rather than "citizen" (Draft A) to describe the protected class. "In-
habitant" may have conformed with the usage in earlier claims to 
colonial privileges and immunities. For example, the claim of rights 
as English subjects in the Declaration and Resolves of the First 
Continental Congress was stated on behalf of the colonial "inhabit-
ants." Even Dickinson's 1776 draft articles used the term. The 
prerevolutionary colonists considered themselves the King's colo-
nial subjects. They had not been colonial "citizens" in the same 
manner that they later became United States "citizens," because co-
lonial naturalization powers were in debate with England. In early 
independence, the more familiar term was used. Further, "free in-
habitants" and "citizen" may have been interchangeable because of 
the peculiar revolutionary American situation. The colonists were 
British subjects prior to 1776. With independence, colonists could 
maintain their British nationality by leaving. The decision to re-
main in the states was considered an acceptance of the new govern-
ment's protection and created a bond of allegiance. State 
citizenship was a choice of residence, not birth. Thus, "inhabitant" 
and "citizen" were effectively coterminous. 71 
Madison later chastized the use of "free inhabitants" in the Ar-
ticles of Confederation. 
It seems to be a construction scarcely avoidable, however, that 
those who come under the denomination of free inhabitants of a 
State, although not citizens of such State, are entitled, in every 
other State, to all the privileges of free citizens of the latter; that 
is, to greater privileges than they may be entitled to in their own 
state.72 
Even if "inhabitant" and "citizen" were synonymous under the Ar-
ticles, the lack of a uniform naturalization power could lead to en-
abling aliens to acquire citizenship in one state in order to obtain 
71. G. BANCROFT, 5 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 200 (1883) cited 
ill F. FRANKLIN, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NATURALIZATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 5 (1906). 
72. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 270 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
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the rights of citizenship in a second state where they would other-
wise be ineligible. 
As Madison posited, the Articles of Confederation language 
may have resulted from careless drafting through the reliance on 
familiar terms, ignorant of the need for reexamination in a new con-
text. Alternatively, "inhabitant" may have been more limited than 
"citizen" in this context. Its choice may have been designed to 
eliminate the problem causing Madison to disparage article IV, 
since it had been used earlier as synonymous with "subjects of the 
King inhabiting the colony" and did not apply to alien residents or 
other European persons whose colonial legislative naturalization 
was not recognized in England. 73 A decade after the revolution 
when Madison wrote The Federalist, "inhabitant" had probably lost 
its original common implication of a "British subject inhabiting the 
colony;" inhabitants were no longer British subjects. On the other 
hand, "citizen" reflected the political sense of self-government and 
was now the more common usage. 
The committee draft provided for the freedom of interstate 
movement for all persons. Draft B had only protected interstate 
movement "to trade and traffick" which limited the impact of a 
broadly drafted privileges and immunities clause. The narrower 
scope of the committee draft rights and privileges clause eliminated 
the need to limit rights of interstate movement to commercial be-
havior. The apparent elimination of the right to exclude undesir-
able citizens of other states was acceptable because the most 
undesirable persons were excepted. 
The committee draft included the Draft A and Draft B provisos 
permitting nondiscriminatory taxation of imported property and 
conferred protection on state property equal to the protection for 
property of individuals from other states. 
C. Approval of Article IV by the Continental Congress 
The Committee submitted its report on the new articles to Con-
gress for consideration on November 13, 1777. Congress approved 
it after making a number of changes.74 
Congress took into consideration the articles reported by the 
committee as proper to be included in the confederation, and the 
73. See J. KETTNER, supra note 7, on the refusal of British authorities to recognize 
naturalization by colonial legislatures. The colony that conferred naturalization might be 
able to treat the alien as a citizen within their boundaries, but no other colony was under a 
similar obligation. 
74. 9 JOURNALS, supra note I, at 899. 
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following were adopted: "And the better to secure and perpetu-
ate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the 
different States in this union, the free inhabitants of each of these 
states, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, 
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in 
the respective states; and the people of each state shall have free 
ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy 
therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the 
same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants 
thereof respectively; provided that such restriction shall not ex-
tend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into 
any State to any other State of which the owner is an inhabitant; 
provided, also, that no imposition, duties, or restriction, shall be 
laid by any State on the property of the United States, or either 
of them." 
823 
This form of article IV of the Articles of Confederation differs 
substantially from the committee form. No record of the discussion 
for the changes exists. However, congressional behavior may be un-
derstood by comparing the new form with earlier drafts. 
1. Clause 1: The Privileges and Immunities of Free Citizens. 
[T]he free inhabitants of each of these states, paupers, 
vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled 
to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the respective 
states .... 
In Congress the committee draft restored "free" before "inhabit-
ants" to clarify that a person bound to labor in one state would not 
receive the rights of a "free citizen" in another. The distinction be-
tween "inhabitants" and "free inhabitants" also suggests an aware-
ness of the problems of slavery - slaves being excluded from the 
rights of free citizens. 
Congress also chose the Draft B wording in preference to the 
committee report by specifying that the free inhabitants receive all 
"privileges and immunities of free citizens" rather than all "rights 
and privileges of natural born free citizens." Congress further pro-
vided that free inhabitants receive all privileges and immunities of 
free citizens "in the respective states" and not just in the state where 
they go to reside. 
The committee draft prohibited states from interfering with per-
sons and property crossing state lines and secured residential citi-
zenship rights. It ignored the right to inherit property in another 
state, one of the oldest of all intercolonial rights, traceable to Cal-
vin's Case. The extension of the protection of the first clause to free 
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inhabitants "in the respective states" may have been intended to fill 
that glaring gap. 
The choice of "immunities" instead of "rights" in conjunction 
with "privileges" may have indicated congressional intent to nar-
row the conferred protection. An expansion of the protected class 
could reduce each member's protections. "Immunities" suggests 
equal regulatory exemption treatment. "Rights" may include af-
firmative benefits such as voting or sharing in state resources. On 
the other hand, the choice of "immunities" over "rights" may lack 
significance. The original charter documents referred to "liberties, 
franchises and immunities," while the colonial declarations against 
the Stamp Act and other English laws claimed that charter "rights" 
had been violated. This suggests that clear distinctions between the 
terms were vanishing. 
The elimination of "natural born" permits distinctions between 
native born and naturalized state citizens to be perpetuated against 
citizens of other states. Thus, voting and office-holding residence 
requirements might be perpetuated. 
2. Free Ingress and Regress to Other States. 
. . . and the people of each state shall have free ingress and 
regress to and from any other State .... 
When Congress revised the committee version, it severed the 
right of movement from property rights. The committee draft re-
stricted a state's power to protect its own interests. The previous 
draft references to free ingress and egress of person and property 
"without hinderance, molestation or imposition of any kind" liter-
ally prohibited states from excluding diseased or other undesirable 
property from other states. The earlier drafts only permitted non-
discriminatory imposts and duties. Congress saw that states needed 
greater power over property from other states but did not wish to 
give states greater power over interstate travel. 
3. The Privileges of Trade and Commerce . 
. . . and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and com-
merce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as 
the inhabitants thereof respectively .... 
The congressional revision permitted states to regulate nonresi-
dents engaging in trade and commerce to the same extent that it 
regulated its own inhabitants. Trade barriers and prohibitions were 
allowed when based on the goods' nature or source of origin rather 
than on the residence of the person intending to import them. 
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Madison was perplexed, however, over the need to have a separate 
clause for the privileges of trade. "[W]hat was meant by super-
adding to 'all privileges and immunities of free citizens,' 'all the 
privileges of trade and commerce,' cannot be readily determined."75 
Several alternatives may account for the separation of the trade 
and commerce privilege from the privileges of free citizens.76 Lin-
guistically, the best explanation is that the level of protection af-
forded trade and commerce was different from that afforded other 
privileges and immunities of citizens. The state's power to treat 
nonresidents in virtually any nondiscriminating way was modified 
by a limited guarantee for nonresidents to remove property from the 
state despite any state restriction on its own citizens. 
4. Proviso for the Removal of Imported Property . 
. . . provided that such restriction shall not extend so far as to 
prevent the removal of property imported into any State to any 
other State of which the owner is an inhabitant .... 
The congressional revision acknowledged a state interest in 
preventing importation by permitting states to regulate trade of per-
sons from out of state with restrictions applicable to state residents. 
The nondiscrimination policy dealt inadequately with the state's 
power to prevent exports. Import control protects against harm 
from such property, but export control serves to retain the benefit of 
the property within the state. This interest was acceptable for natu-
ral resources or even property that originated in a state, but not 
where the property did not originate in the state and where the 
owner was not a state inhabitant. If a state could forbid the re-
moval of property brought into the state by a nonresident, the non-
resident might be discouraged from entering the state with property 
75. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 270 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
76. One alternative would find that the privileges and immunities of citizenship are con-
fined to participation in self-government and are separate from privileges of trade and com-
merce. This is unlikely, because Dickinson's draft clearly considered the separate provision 
for trade and commerce privileges in his article VII to be an exception from the general 
protection for privileges in article VI. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
A second alternative is to join Madison in charging the drafters with sloppiness. The 
separate trade privileges clause could have been a relic of the early drafts which conferred all 
privileges and immunities of citizens only on persons coming to another state to reside there 
and had to provide separately for privileges afforded nonresidents who merely wished to do 
business without establishing a new residence. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. 
A third possibility is that the Congressional revision was not intended to extend the privi-
leges and immunities clause benefit beyond persons seeking new residence. This would entitle 
free inhabitants of a state "to the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the respective 
states" [by moving to other states]. 
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to trade. A law forbidding removal of any property brought into 
the state would affect persons who reside in the state differently 
than those who reside elsewhere. This different impact may have 
inspired the clause in the article IV congressional revision prevent-
ing nondiscriminatory restrictions on "the removal of property, im-
ported into any State, to any other state of which the owner is an 
inhabitant." The new clause may have also protected the slave-
owner traveling to another state. Slavery was not yet illegal in any 
of the states, but abolition was beginning to be discussed. 
5. Intergovernmental Immunities . 
. . . provided, also, that no imposition, duties, or restriction, 
shall be laid by any State on the property of the United States, or 
either of them. 
Each of the earlier article IV drafts protected the interstate 
movement of property from restrictions except for the same imposts 
and duties imposed on residents. This property immunity was ex-
tended to state and United States property. 77 The revision of the 
article to expand state power on imports led Congress to reconsider 
the impact of that expansion on interstate relations when applied to 
the property of other states or the United States. The regulation 
and taxation of a sovereign entity would have been a source of fric-
tion. The revised article eliminated the problem by granting a total 
governmental property immunity. 
D. The Adoption of Article IV 
A committee of three-Mr. Richard Henry Lee, Mr. Duane, 
and Mr. Lovell-was appointed "to revise and arrange the articles 
of confederation agreed to; and to prepare a circular letter to the 
respective states to accompany the said articles."78 The Committee 
77. "And provided also that the benefit of this Article Shall extend to the property of 
the United States, and of any particular State, in the Same manner as to the property of an 
Individual in any State." See 9 JOURNALS, supra note I, at 888. [Draft A]. 
"Provided also that the Benefit of this Article shall Extend to the property of the United 
States and of any particular State in the same Manner as to the property of an Individual." 
See id. [Draft B]. 
"And provided also that the benefit of this article shall extend to the property of the 
United States, and of any particular State, in the same manner as to the property of an 
Individual." See id. at 889. [Committee Report]. 
78. See 9 JoURNALS, supra note I, at 900. Their revised version was as follows: 
ART.4. The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse 
among the people of the different states in this union, the free inhabitants of each of 
these states, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be enti-
tled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states; and the 
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changed only two words of article IV, substituting "among" for 
"between" in the preamble and "several" for "respective" in the 
text. The Committee also revised capitalization and punctuation. 
The article was adopted in that form by the Continental Congress 
on November 15, 1777 for circulation to the states. 
North Carolina delegate, Thomas Burke, recorded his thoughts 
on the Articles of Confederation privileges and immunities clause. 
Burke was exceptionally wary of the provisions threatening state 
sovereignty. The Continental Congress adopted Articles of Confed-
eration article II at his motion that: "Each state retains its sover-
eignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction 
and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to 
the United States, in Congress assembled." However, Burke left 
Congress a month before the proposal of the privileges and immuni-
ties clause and had no special knowledge of its meaning when he 
commented on it: 
The Constitution of No. Carolina permits not the Privilege of 
Citizens to any who have not resided therein 12 months, and 
paid Taxes.79 (local protection is given to all within the Terri-
tory) the Legislature therefore cannot ratify an artikle which 
gives such priviliges to persons residing in other States. Our 
Commons are voted for by all free Citizens, and if the Inhabit-
ants of our Neighboring States have the priviliges of Citizens in 
ours they might insist upon the right of voting for Members of 
Our Legislature which would be a political absurdity. It seems 
therefore proper that this article should be Amended by adding 
after the clause refer'd to- not inconsistant with their respective 
Constitutions:80 
Burke's suggestion would have rendered the article ineffective, 
because any state could subsequently discriminate against nonresi-
dents by amending its constitution.81 His comments present a seri-
people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, 
and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same 
duties, impositions and restrictions, as the inhabitants thereof respectively; pro-
vided, that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of 
property, imported into any State, to any other State of which the owner is an 
inhabitant; provided also, that no imposition, duties, or restriction, shall be laid by 
any State on the property of the United States, or either of them. 
9 JOURNALS, supra note I, at 908-09. 
79. "That every foreigner, who comes to settle in this State, having first taken an ·oath of 
allegiance to the same, may purchase, or, by other just means, acquire, hold, and transfer 
land, or other real estate; and after one year's residence, shall be deemed a free citizen." N.C. 
CONST. of 1776, art. XL, reprinted in W. SWINDLER, supra note 10, at 407. 
80. 2 LEITERS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 552 (E. Burnett 
ed. 1921-36) [hereinafter LEITERS]. 
81. The state constitutions had been adopted by simple vote in the state legislatures. 
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ous problem if his understanding of the article's effect was correct. 
The possibility of nonresidents voting for state officials was unac-
ceptable. Eliminating the voting residence requirement would have 
offended a number of states. Since no state suggested changing the 
article to respond to this problem, Burke's interpretation of the 
clause was probably not accepted. 
The clause was most likely intended to embody the colonial 
right to be free from discrimination. 82 Discrimination on the basis 
of residence permitted under the charters would not violate the 
clause. Thus, the privileges and immunities of free citizens would 
include rights to sue, rights to own property, and rights to be free of 
discriminatory regulation-but would not afford nonresidents 
rights to vote or hold political office. 
Burke had one more objection to the proposed article IV: 
The Provisionary clause of this article, in my opinion, deprives 
the States of every power to increase or regulate their particular 
Commerce, Agriculture or Manufactures. They cannot prevent 
by Duties or restrictions importations, or Exportations Injurious 
to any of them. This surely is what no staple state ought to ad-
mit, and that of all ours, who has so many Staples.83 
Burke's objection is that the "proviso" that restrictions on trade 
and commerce privileges "shall not extend so far as to prevent the 
removal of property, imported into any State, to any other State of 
which the owner is inhabitant" deprives states of the power to pre-
vent "importations or exportations injurious to any of them." He 
assumes that a state cannot prevent imports by its citizens because 
restrictions on trade cannot prevent property removal to any other 
state which the owner inhabits. This construction overlooks the 
grammatical placement of the proviso. It is an exception only to 
82. There are many other alternative readings. First, the privileges and immunities of 
citizens might not refer to voting, which could be viewed as an affirmative right rather than a 
privilege or immunity limiting government power. On the other hand, the political back-
ground which identified the phrase with the colonial claim for self-government suggests that 
Burke was correct in believing that the privileges and immunities of citizens include voting, at 
least in the negative sense that laws should not bind persons unless represented in the law-
making body. 
Second, the deletion of reference to "natural born" free citizens supports the view that 
durational residence requirements for privileges are permissible. This theory also poses diffi-
culties. While durational residence requirements existed in the political sphere for voting and 
office holding, they would not seem tolerable with respect to other civil rights such as prop-
erty ownership or rights to bring suit. 
Third, the entitlement to the privileges of citizenship might require changing residence to 
obtain benefits. The omission of the express references to residence changes casts doubt on 
this interpretation. 
83. LETTERS, supra note 80, at 552. 
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state power to enact nondiscriminatory restrictions over trade and 
commerce of persons of another state. It does not apply to state 
power over its own inhabitants. On its face, the proviso only pre-
vents states from barring nonresidents from taking out of the state 
any property that was brought into the state from elsewhere. While 
a state could not prevent a nonresident who has brought goods into 
the state from elsewhere from taking those goods to a home state, a 
prohibition on natural resource exportation would be valid because 
those goods were not imported into any state. Similarly, a prohibi-
tion on the importation of any goods would be valid, because the 
proviso only protects nonresident exportation of goods they import 
lawfully. 
In June 1778, when Congress asked the states to report on Arti-
cles of Confederation ratification, few states had ratified them with-
out comment, and a number of state representatives had offered 
amendments. Every outside proposal was heard, considered, and 
rejected. The rejection of the proposed changes may have been in-
fluenced by the fear that any change would compel each state to 
reconsider the Articles of Confederation de novo causing greater de-
lay in ratification. Nevertheless, the proposals for change show the 
Articles' perceived problems. On June 22, 1778, the Maryland dele-
gates proposed that "paupers" be omitted and that "that one state 
shall not be burthened with the maintenance of the poor who may 
remove into it from any of the others in the Union" be added.84 
The issue that led to the exclusion of paupers from article IV pro-
tections was confronted directly in a separate substantive provision. 
The effect of the proposed new clause would make it unnecessary to 
separately exclude paupers and would have confirmed the worthi-
ness of individuals who happened to be paupers without endanger-
ing the social welfare structure. 
On June 25, 1778, the South Carolina delegates offered their 
amendments:85 
The delegates from South Carolina, being called on, moved 
the following amendments in behalf of their state: 
1. In article fourth, between the words "free inhabitants," 
insert "white." 
Passed in the negative. Two ayes, eight noes, one divided. 
2. In the next line after the words "these states," insert 
"those who refuse to take up arms in defence of the 
confederacy." 
84. 11 JouRNALS, supra note 1, at 631 (W. Forded. 1908). 
85. Id. at 652-53. 
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Passed in the negative. Three ayes, eight noes. 
3. After the words "several states," insert "according to the 
law of such states respectively for the government of their own 
free white inhabitants." 
Passed in the negative. Two ayes, eight noes, one divided. 
4. After the words "of which the owner is an inhabitant," 
insert "except in such cases of embargo." 
Passed in the negative. Two ayes, eight noes, one divided. 
South Carolina was concerned with article IV's impact on free 
blacks. The first and third proposals expressly excluded free blacks 
from the article's benefits and from being used as a basis to measure 
the rights to which citizens of other states would be entitled. The 
rejection of these two proposals may have reflected a desire to pre-
vent discrimination against free blacks, or it could have been pre-
mised on an agreement to disagree on whether blacks came within 
the historic understanding of "inhabitants."86 
South Carolina's second proposal excluded Tories from citizen-
ship privileges but also affected conscientious objectors like the 
Quakers. 87 The rejection of this proposal likely reflected the ac-
knowledged state power to treat such persons as badly as it treated 
its own citizens who refused to bear arms. While paupers, 
vagabonds, and fugitives were undesirable characters, persons who 
had a temporary political disagreement were not so clearly danger-
ous to the state. 
South Carolina's fourth proposal for amending article IV per-
mitted a state to prevent the removal of property by a nonresident 
to a home state in cases of embargo. Here the exception could swal-
low the rule permitting nonresidents to remove imported property. 
86. According to D. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN 
POLITICS, 1765-1820, at 153-54 (1971), this amendment was rejected because the 
delegates were in a hurry to finish the Articles, and not for any major sub~tantive 
reasons. If haste was indeed the reason for not including the word white and thus 
explicitly limiting comity to "free white inhabitants," then South Carolina and 
other Deep South states may have felt no obligation, under the Articles or the Con-
stitution, to grant comity to free blacks from other states. The understanding that 
"free inhabitants" in the Articles applied only to whites may very well have carried 
over into the more broadly worded provision for comity in the Constitution. 
P. FINKELMAN, supra note 52, at 31-32 n.36. 
87. Georgia made a similar proposal. Georgia had suggested in its ratification order 
that after "vagabond" should be added "all persons who refuse to bear arms in defense of the 
State to which they belong, and all persons who have been or shall be attained of high treason 
in any of the United States." II JOURNALS, supra note I, at 671. The delegate from Georgia 
had not received instructions when asked by Congress on June 25 to report. but indicated 
that the state would ratify as the document stood. !d. at 656. Thus. the amendments recom-
mended by the state. which also included adding the words "white inhabitants" to article IV. 
were not presented to the Continental Congress. 
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It also raised the specter of embargoes of different dimensions 
promulgated by each state to the confusion of foreign relations. 
On June 26, 1778, the Continental Congress adopted the Arti-
cles of Confederation, effective as soon as ratified by all of the states. 
However, Maryland held out, and it was not until 1781 that every 
state ratified the Articles. A committee was then appointed to re-
port on the effect of the Articles of Confederation. August 22, 
1781, the comn'fittee responded with some diffidence:88 
The Committee appointed to prepare an Exposition of the 
Confederation, a plan for its complete execution and supplemen-
tal articles report. 
That they ought to be discharged from the exposition of the 
Confederation because such a comment would be voluminous if 
coextensive with the subject, the omission to enumerate any Con-
gressional powers become an argument against their existence, 
and it will be early enough to insist upon them, when they shall 
be exercised and disputed. 
They further report that the Confederation requires execu-
tion in the following manner ... 
2 By describing the privileges and immunities to which the 
citizens of one State are entitled in another. 
The Continental Congress never determined the privileges and 
immunities to which citizens of one state were entitled to in an-
other. The Articles of Confederation failed to create a viable en-
forcement mechanism. No federal court existed to interpret the 
document, and the article IV ambiguities remained unresolved 
although article IV was, in theory, binding on the states. 
Despite uncertainty, one function of article IV of the Articles of 
Confederation remained clear: it prohibited states from imposing 
any restriction not applicable to residents on nonresidents engaged 
in trade or commerce. Without federal enforcement, however, this 
command was breached with impunity during the pre-Constitution 
period. When the state delegates convened and proposed a new 
Constitution, they considered the problem of article IV violations 
occurring without redress. Madison noted in his Preface to Debates 
in the Convention of 1787 that: 
The same want of a general power over Commerce, led to an 
exercise of the power separately, by the States, which not only 
proved abortive, but engendered rival, conflicting and angry reg-
ulations .... In sundry instances as of N.Y., N.J., P" & Md the 
88. 21 JOURNALS, supra note I, at 894. 
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navigation laws treated the Citizens89 other States as aliens. 90 
Ill. THE CONSTITUTION 
Sect. 2. The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privi-
leges and immunities of citizens in the several states. 91 
Under the Articles of Confederation, each person was a citizen 
only of the state of permanent residence. States had obligations to 
citizens of other states and to the other states themselves, but the 
state was always a mediating body between the individual and Con-
gress. The Constitution changed this relationship. It gave Congress 
direct power to legislate over individuals. The direct relationship 
between individual and national government transformed citizen-
ship in the United States. For example, article I gave Congress the 
power to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization."92 Federal 
legislature qualifications included requirements that the legislator 
be a "Citizen of the United States."93 The role once played by the 
King in uniting the colonies under a single citizenship was now 
played by the national government. 
The convention did not consider the privileges and immunities 
clause until the national character of the new government had been 
established. The Virginia delegation opened the Constitutional 
Convention by presenting a set of resolutions stating principles for 
an essentially national government. Charles Pinckney of South 
Carolina presented a plan that slightly altered the Articles of Con-
federation. Pinckney's plan was referred to committee and never 
discussed on the convention floor. It was used later, however, by 
the Committee on Detail.94 After some weeks of discussing the Vir-
ginia plan principles, William Paterson of New Jersey presented an 
89. In this edition, the editor noted that the word "of" is inserted in the transcript after 
"Citizens." 
90. NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 3, at 14. 
Pennsylvania established a form for registering resident-owned ships. 1778 PENN-
SYLVANIA LAWS Ch. LXXX § 7 (THE FIRST LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENN-
SYLVANIA, J. Cushing ed. 1984). New Jersey did so in its navigation act, 1781 NEw JERSEY 
LAWS CH. CCXCIII§ 6 (THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, J. Cushing ed. 
1981). Maryland provided for ship registration in 1784 MARYLAND LAWS Ch. LXXIX 
(THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND, J. Cushing ed. 1981). Maryland ships 
were taxed at six pence per ton while all other ships were taxed at one shilling per ton at 
entrance or clearance. !d. § 21. Taxes were also laid on specified good~ with a deduction of 
one sixth for vessels built and navigated by Maryland residents. !d. at Ch. LXXIV. § 16. 
91. NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 3, at 625; 2 RECORDS, supra note 3. at 601. 
92. U.S. CaNST. art. I. § 8, cl. 4. 
93. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, § 3, cl. 3. 
94. NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 3, at 33 n.36. 
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alternative proposal more closely conforming to the Articles of 
Confederation. Madison opposed the New Jersey plan on June 19, 
1787, and raised the issue of the Confederation's impotency to en-
force its provisions. He argued that the New Jersey plan suffered 
from the same infirmity. 
3. Will it prevent trespasses of the States on each other? Of 
these enough has been already seen. He instanced Acts of Virg.a 
& Maryland which give95 a preference to their own Citizens in 
cases where the Citizens of other States are entitled to equality of 
privileges by the Articles of Confederation.96 
Although the notes of Madison's speech do not specify the state 
statutes that ostensibly violated the Articles of Confederation, he 
probably referred to reductions for state citizens on duties owed by 
ships using the state ports.97 Those preferences led Maryland and 
Virginia to enact a compact anticipating the wider meeting in An-
napolis and finally the convention itself. 98 
The conflict between large and small states, reflected in the rival 
plans at the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention, was resolved 
by a compromise that left the states with two votes each in the Sen-
ate and with House representation based on population. With some 
basic principles resolved, comprehensive document drafting was re-
95. The editor of NOTES OF DEBATES notes that the word "gave" is substituted in the 
transcript for "give." 
96. NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 3, at 143. 
97. MARYLAND LAWS, 1784, Ch. LXXXIV, §XVI: 
And, to encourage the building of merchant vessels within this state, and to navi-
gate them by citizens of this or some of the United States, Be it enacted, That on 
imports in any vessel built within this state, and navigated by a master, citizen of 
this state, and by mariners, one half of whom are citizens of this or some one of the 
United States, and one half of the property of such vessel actually belongs to some 
one or more of the citizens of this state, there shall be a deduction from the duties 
imposed by this act on enumerated articles, one sixth part thereof, and from the two 
percent duty on non-enumerated articles, there shall be a deduction of one eighth 
part thereof, and if reducted to one per cent there shall be a deduction of one fourth 
part thereof; and on exports in any such vessel, navigated and owned as aforesaid, 
there shall be a deduction of one third part of the duty imposed by this act; and on 
imports in any vessel built within this state, and entirely owned by citizens thereof, 
and wholly navigated by a master and mariners, all of whom are citizens of this 
state, there shall be a deduction from the duties imposed by this act on enumerated 
articles, of one third part thereof, and from the two per cent duty, a deduction of 
one fourth part thereof, and if reduced to one cent a deduction of one half part 
thereof; and on exports in any such vessel, there shall be a deduction of one half 
part of the duty imposed by this act. 
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, 1783, ch. XXXVIII [11 Henings Statutes at Large 289], §III: 
Provided always, That no ship or other vessel, belonging to any citizen or citizens of 
this commonwealth, and no ship or other vessel, under the burthen of sixty tons, 
belonging to any citizen or citizens of the state of Maryland, shall be subject to the 
duty on tonnage. 
98. See 12 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE 50, LAWS OF VIRGINIA, 1785 ch. XVII. 
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ferred to a Committee of Detail. The committee was to bring to-
gether the principles adopted by the convention with articles not in 
dispute. The committee draft of August 1787 introduced the privi-
leges and immunities clause to the Convention. 
The free (inhabs) Citizens of each State shall be intitled to all 
Privileges & Immunities of free Citizens in the sevl States.99 
In the August 6, Committee of Detail report, "(inhabs)" was 
dropped and "free" omitted. Madison subsequently argued in The 
Federalist that "inhabitants" in the privileges and immunities clause 
suggested that an alien resident of one state could achieve the rights 
of a citizen in other states. "Citizen" avoided this possibility. 
Under the Articles, the biggest problem in conferring privileges and 
immunities on citizens of other states had been any one state's abil-
ity to naturalize foreigners on conditions unacceptable in other 
states. The new Constitution conferred on Congress the uniform 
power of naturalization. 100 Thus, the Committee of Detail report 
specified that "the citizens" of each state be entitled to the privileges 
and immunities of citizens. 
"Free" modified "inhabitants" to prevent slaves from being 
given rights. However, this term was unnecessary when "citizen" 
was used, because slaves were not citizens. There was no reason to 
deny indentured servants (if any remained after the Revolution had 
disrupted any lingering indenture pattern) the rights granted to citi-
zens (including bound citizens). 
The Committee of Detail report also eliminated "free" in the 
measure of rights afforded citizens of a state. They were only enti-
tled to the privileges and immunities afforded "citizens" in contrast 
to "free citizens." This change may have encouraged omission of 
the exception clause for "paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from jus-
tice," who could be bound or imprisoned according to the law ap-
plicable to residents. That law may have sufficiently protected state 
interests. 
99. 2 RECORDS, supra note 3, at 173-74. Pinckney claimed to have introduced this 
clause into the Constitution. See Appendix A, CCCXXXVIII; 3 RECORDS, supra note 3, at 
445-46. 
This clause was in the last of the series of documents found among the Wilson Papers in 
the Library of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Farrand numbered the document IX 
and noted: '"Found among the Wilson Papers, and in Wilson's handwriting, but with emen-
dations in Rutledge's hand. Parts in parentheses were crossed out in the original; italics 
represent additions by Wilson; emendations by Rutledge are in angle brackets < >." 2 
RECORDS, supra note 3, at 163 n.l7. The section on privileges and immunities was part of a 
longer section enclosed in angle brackets, written by Rutledge. 
100. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 271 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
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Sixty-five years later, the Supreme Court discussed whether the 
word "citizen" included free blacks. Chief Justice Taney argued 
that "citizen" excludes "every description of persons ... not fully 
recognized as citizens in the several states." Consequently, he con-
tended that free blacks were not citizens.101 Justice Curtis pointed 
to the defeat of the South Carolina amendments to the Articles to 
demonstrate that free blacks were entitled to the privileges and im-
munities of citizens under the Articles. He argued that nothing in 
the Constitution suggests that it deprived anyone of citizenship; 
thus, free blacks who were citizens under the Articles are citizens 
under the Constitution. Nothing in the Constitutional Convention 
debates indicates that thought was given to the status of free 
blacks. 102 
One mystery in the new article is why the Committee of Detail 
used only the privileges and immunities clause and did not include 
the separate Articles of Confederation provisions dealing with inter-
state travel and the privileges of trade and commerce. 
The Constitution conferred powers on Congress that did not ex-
ist under the Articles. Congress had the power to regulate com-
merce among the several states. 103 It could decide whether 
individuals' rights to remove property imported into one state to 
101. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 419 (1857). 
102. In 1821, Charles Pinckney spoke in Congress on the admission of Missouri. He 
claimed that he proposed article IV, § 2. He stated that: 
at the time I drew that constitution, I perfectly knew that there did not then exist 
such a thing in the Union as a black or colored citizen, nor could I then have 
conceived it possible such a thing could have ever existed in it; nor, notwithstanding 
all that has been said on the subject, do I now believe one does exist in it. 
3 RECORDS, supra note 3, at 446. 
No accurate copy of Pinckney's proposal exists. Farrand constructed a sketch based on 
several sources. The exact language of article IV which Pinckney proposed is also lost. Far-
rand includes the relevant portion from observations Pinckney prepared as a speech to ac-
company his draft: 
The 4th article ... is formed exactly upon the principles of the 4th article of the 
present confederation, except with this difference, that the demand of the Executive 
of a State for any fugitive criminal offender shall be complied with. It is now con-
fined to treason, felony, or other high misdemeanor. 
/d. at 606-07. 
Pinckney's proposals were referred to the Committee of Detail with all other proposals, 
but he was not on the Committee which reported out the final form. 2 RECORDS, supra note 
3, at 97-98. Pinckney may not have influenced the final form of the article nor engaged in any 
discussion at the Convention over its meaning. His views on black citizenship three decades 
later had little if any relevance to the understanding of the convention or the ratifying 
conventions. 
103. Being in the same terms with the power over foreign commerce, the same ex-
tent, if taken literally, would belong to it. Yet it is very certain that it grew out of 
the abuse of the power by the importing States in taxing the non-importing, and was 
intended as a negative and preventive provision against injustice among the States 
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their state of residence should be protected. Congressional power 
was a more flexible tool than the Articles' ban on such state laws. 
With the removal of that proviso from the Articles, however, there 
was no longer any reason to distinguish between the privileges and 
immunities of citizens generally and the privileges of trade and 
commerce. Thus Madison, writing in The Federalist, saw no need 
for a separate trade privileges clause. 
The elimination of the clause providing for "free ingress and 
egress to and from any other state" is more difficult to explain. Pro-
fessor Chafee wrote that, "[t]he reason for not expressly giving 'free 
ingress and regress' across state lines must be that it is in the Consti-
tution, somewhere else. But where?"104 He apparently finds it later 
in the commerce clause reinforced by the due process clause. 105 
The Framers may have considered it implicit in article IV. Since 
the privileges and immunities clause grants a citizen rights in an-
other state, any attempt by the origin or destination state to prevent 
interstate travel would deny the individual those rights. 
Finally, the Committee of Detail report omitted the exception 
for paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice contained in arti-
cle IV of the Articles of Confederation. The exception for fugitives 
had probably been redundant, because both the Constitution and 
the Articles provided for the extradition of fugitives to the state 
charging them with a crime. The Constitution extended the extra-
dition clause to persons charged with any crime, not just treason, 
felony or high misdemeanors. Thus, fugitives could never claim all 
privileges and immunities of citizens under the Constitution, be-
cause they were always subject to extradition. 
The pauper, on the other hand, raised unique questions. Consti-
tutional national citizenship would break down part of the reluc-
tance to acknowledge as citizens paupers moving into the state. 
themselves, rather than as a power to be used for the positive purposes of the Gen-
eral Government, in which alone, however, the remedial power could be lodged. 
Letter from James Madison to J.C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829). 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRIT-
INGS OF JAMES MADISON 14-15, reprinted in 3 RECORDS, supra note 3, at 478. 
104. Z. CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 185 
(1956). 
105. !d. at 192-93. Chafee dismisses article IV as a source for the right of interstate travel 
because the Court had not used that clause. He also indicated that the use of article IV as the 
basis of the right would be too restricting. He reasoned that article IV forbids only nondis-
crimination and concluded that a state could exclude nonresidents by prohibiting its own 
residents from returning if they left the state for a period of time. His hypothetical need not 
lead to that result. Article IV specifies that a citizen is entitled to all privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens in the several states. If the nonresident is entitled to the privilege of a citizen in 
another state, any barrier to return is irrelevant. 
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Further, the obligation of support for the poor was local; therefore, 
the refusal to permit an individual to settle in a particular local area 
to prevent the imposition of a community burden would be com-
mon to persons within and without the state. The right to cross 
state borders might thus be protected by article IV, but the right to 
reside in a particular community within a state was unprotected. 
The paupers and vagabonds exception-as well as that for fugi-
tives-may have been unnecessary to preserve the state's right to 
deal with the problems they posed. 
On August 6, the Committee of Detail report was submitted to 
the Convention. The privileges and immunities clause was pro-
posed as a separate article, numbered XIV. 
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges 
and immunities of citizens in the several states. 106 
The clause received little debate at the Convention. One propo-
sal required a period of citizenship before individuals would be eligi-
ble to serve in the national legislature. On August 13, Pennsylvania 
delegates objected that the requirement conflicted with their consti-
tutional provision granting foreigners all the rights of citizens after 
two years' residence. Wilson argued that foreigners who came to 
Pennsylvania had been promised full participation and that the 
adoption of such a restriction would be a breach of faith. 
Mr GOVr MORRIS moved to add to the end of the section 
[art IV. S. 2] a proviso that the limitation of seven years should 
not affect the rights of any person now a Citizen .... 
Mr WILSON read the clause in the Constitution of Pena giv-
ing to foreigners after two years residence all the rights whatso-
ever of citizens, combined it with the article of Confederation 
making the Citizens of one State Citizens of all, inferred the obli-
gation Pena was under to maintain the faith thus pledged to her 
citizens of foreign birth, and the just complaints which her fail-
ure would authorize. 107 
The discussion suggests that citizenship rights included candi-
dacy and perhaps voting. The convention was concerned with the 
106. NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 3, at 394; 2 RECORDS, supra note 3, at 187. 
107. NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 3, at 439, 441; 2 RECORDS, supra note 3, at 270, 
272. The Pennsylvania Constitution provided in § 42 that 
Every foreigner of good character who comes to settle in this state, having first 
taken an oath or affirmation of allegiance to the same, may purchase, or by other 
just means acquire, -hold, and transfer land or other real estate; and after one year's 
residence, shall be deemed a free denizen thereof, and entitled to all the rights of a 
natural born subject of this state, except that he shall not be capable of being elected 
a representative until after two years residence. 
8 PA. CONST. of 1776, § 42, reprinted in W. SwiNDLER, supra note 10, at 284. 
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merits of the citizenship requirement, but no one responded to the 
Pennsylvania delegate's concern over vested rights. Perhaps the ar-
gument was too obvious to voice. Pennsylvania citizens were not 
deprived by the proposed Constitution of any rights which they 
presently had. Prior to the Constitution, there was no real national 
government. The potential for new Pennsylvania citizens to be se-
lected as a delegate to the Continental Congress was not compara-
ble to the position of representative in Congress after adoption of 
the Constitution. They would continue to be afforded the privileges 
and immunities of citizenship in other states secured by the 
Articles. 
On August 28, 1787, the Convention considered the privileges 
and immunities clause, numbered article XIV. 
Art XIV was taken up. 
Ge"1 PINKNEY was not satisfied with it. He seemed to wish 
some provision should be included in favor of property in slaves. 
On the question on Art: XIV. 
N.H. ay. Mas ay. C1 ay. N.J. ay. p• ay. Del ay. Md ay. v• 
ay. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo divided. 108 
Madison's notes are unclear about General Charles Cotesworth 
Pinckney's thoughts on amending the clause. He may have sought 
assurances that slaveowners could bring their slaves into other 
states without risking loss. 109 The privileges and immunities clause 
of the Articles had specifically provided that the owners of property 
imported into a state could remove it to the state where they reside. 
That Article was drafted before abolitionism seriously threatened 
slave property, but by 1787 Pinckney may have seen that the pro-
viso protected rights in slaves while in transit. Madison's failure to 
appreciate Pinckney's views may relate to his inability to under-
108. NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 3, at 545; 2 RECORDS, supra note 3, at 443. Far-
rand appears to have erred later, for at 577 he cites the privileges and immunities clause as 
voted on prior to the work of the Committee on Style as .. [t]he citizens of each State shall be 
entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States." This is inconsistent 
with his description of the clause coming from the Committee on Detail and with his footnote 
to the text at 443. If, however, his listing at 577 is accurate, the substitution of .. in" would 
have taken place in the Committee on Style. See id. at 443 n.28, 577 (emphasis supplied). 
109. It is likely that Pinckney was concerned with slave movement and masters in 
transit when he raised the objection. Throughout the convention the proslavery 
representatives had been adamant about protecting their property. It seems odd, 
therefore, not that Pinckney made the suggestion, but that it was not pursued. 
Three likely explanations may be offered. Pinckney may have felt the problem too 
remote or insignificant to worry about; he may have felt it would be impossible to 
win concessions on this point and chose discretion over valor; finally, he may have 
been convinced by his colleagues or upon reconsideration that precedent and the 
existing clause offered enough protection to slave property. 
P. FINKELMAN, supra note 7, at 35 (footnotes omitted). 
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stand why the Articles separated trade and commerce privileges 
from the other privileges and immunities of citizenship. 
Pinckney's concern may have been to assure that other states 
would recognize the slaveowners' property rights to slaves in their 
home state. 110 Thus, the very next article discussed at the Conven-
tion referred to any person charged with treason, felony, or high 
misdemeanor in any state who flees from justice. Pierce Butler and 
Charles Pinckney moved "to require fugitive slaves to be delivered 
up like criminals."111 Although he withdrew the August 28 motion 
to permit voting on the article, Butler renewed it on August 29 
with more carefully considered language. It was unanimously 
accepted. 112 
George Mason of Virginia made the following notes on his draft 
copy of September 12:113 
Section 2nd, Article 4th-The citizens of one State having an 
estate in another, have not secured to them the right of removing 
their property as in the 4th Article of the Confederation-amend 
by adding the following clause: and every citizen having an estate 
in two or more States shall have a right to remove his property 
from one State to another. (not proposed) 
Mason did not make this omission a ground for his opposition to 
the Constitution. Either he considered the absence of restrictions 
on the states an insignificant flaw or the grant of power over inter-
state commerce to be adequate to secure removal of property where 
appropriate. 
On September 12, 1787, the Committee on Style reported out 
the Constitution. They renumbered the privileges and immunities 
clause but made no other changes. 
IV ... Sect. 2. The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all 
110. Because Pinckney raised his objection when article XIV was debated (rather 
than at the time of the debate on the Fugitives from Justice article), it seems that he 
was not referring to fugitive slaves. This assumption is strengthened by the fact that 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Articles of Confederation specifically 
protected property "imported into any State, to be removed to any other States of 
which the owner is an inhabitant." Slaves in transit would of course have been an 
important type of property protected by this clause. It seems fair to assume that 
Pinckney wanted that property protected in the Constitution. 
Id. at 35 n.44. 
111. NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 3, at 545. 
112. Mr. Butler moved to insert after art: XV. "If any person bound to service or 
labor in any of the U. States shall escape into another State, he or she shall not be 
discharged from such service or labor, in consequence of any regulations subsisting 
in the State to which they escape, but shall be delivered up to the person justly 
claiming their service or labor," which was agreed to nem: con: 
NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 3, at 552. 
113. 2 RECORDS, supra note 3, at 636-37. 
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privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states. 114 
On September 15, 1787, the Convention voted to adopt the Con-
stitution as amended and on September 17 voted to adopt it as 
enrolled. 115 
The absence of serious debate over the privileges and immunities 
clause indicates that it was not innovative. Taken from the Articles 
of Confederation, it had supplied the interstate links missing when 
independence was declared. It gave content to United States citi-
zenship. As the Supreme Court has noted, "[T]he provision was 
carried over into the comity article of the Constitution in briefer 
form but with no change of substance or intent, unless it was to 
strengthen the force of the Clause in fashioning a single nation." 116 
IV. RATIFICATION 
[I]n order to the inviolable maintenance of that equality of privi-
leges and immunities to which the citizens of the Union will be 
entitled, the national judiciary ought to preside in all cases in 
which one State or its citizens are opposed to another State or its 
citizens. 1 17 
The article IV privileges and immunities clause drew virtually 
no attention in the debates on Constitutional ratification. Because it 
was so clearly drawn from the Articles of Confederation, those who 
favored rejection of the Constitution in favor of the Articles could 
raise no principled objection. Madison and Hamilton mention the 
clause in The Federalist as support for other propositions. The pro-
vision for a uniform system of naturalization eliminated the cau-
tionary need to identify citizens of a state entitled to privileges and 
immunities. The Constitution omitted state power to exclude spe-
cific classes of undesirables. The other portions of the Articles of 
Confederation clause which balanced state powers over nonresi-
dents were moot when citizenship came from the federal govern-
ment. Indeed Madison's only reference to the privileges and 
immunities clause in The Federalist argued that the provision for a 
uniform system of naturalization cured the major defect of the Arti-
cles and that the language of article IV was better than that of the 
Articles. 118 ' 
114. NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 3, at 625; 2 RECORDS, supra note 3, at 601. 
115. NOTES OF DEBATES. supra note 3, at 652, 655; 2 RECORDS, supra note 3, at 633, 
644. 
116. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 661 (1975) (footnotes omitted). 
117. THE FEDERAI.IST No. 80, at 478 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
118. In the fourth article of the Confederation, it is declared "that the free inhabit-
ants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, 
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Hamilton focused more directly on the privileges and immuni-
ties clause in The Federalist. His purpose was to justify the grant of 
federal jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases; but rather than 
discuss the substance of the clause, he focused on the procedure for 
enforcing it. 119 In short, the clause engendered no controversy 
leading to a discussion illuminating its scope until long after it had 
been adopted. 
V. THE RELEVANCE OF HISTORY TO INTERPRETIVE ISSUES 
Disputes in interpretation of the privileges and immunities 
clause have proliferated in the two centuries since its adoption. 
Partisans of a variety of conflicting interpretations could often draw 
on historical data for support. Ultimately, the issues must be re-
solved in a context broader than that of framers' intent, but, for 
many, questions of meaning cannot be satisfactorily resolved with-
out a connection to intent at some level of generality. 
A. Natural Law 
One of the earliest judicial opinions considering the privileges 
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; 
and the people of each State shall, in every other, enjoy all the privileges of trade and 
commerce,'' etc. There is a confusion of language here which is remarkable. Why 
the terms free inhabitants are used in one part of the article, free citizens in another, 
and people in another; or what was meant by superadding to "all privileges and 
immunities of free citizens," "all the privileges of trade and commerce," cannot 
easily be determined . . . . What would have been the consequence if such persons, 
by residence or otherwise, had acquired the character of citizens under the laws of 
another State, and then asserted their rights as such, both to residence and citizen-
ship, within the State proscribing them. Whatever the legal consequences might 
have been, other consequences would probably have resulted of too serious a nature 
not to be provided against. The new Constitution has accordingly, with great pro-
priety, made provision against them, and all others proceeding from the defect of 
the Confederation on this head, by authorizing the general government to establish 
a uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United States. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 269-71 {J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
119. It may be esteemed the basis of the Union that ''the citizens of each State shall 
be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States." 
And if it be a just principle that every government ought to possess the means of 
executing its own provisions by its OWl/ authority it will follow that in order to the 
inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and immunities to which the 
citizens of the Union will be entitled, the national judiciary ought to preside in all 
cases in which one State or its citizens are opposed to another State or its citizens. 
To secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision against all evasion and sub-
terfuge, it is necessary that its construction should be committed to that tribunal 
which, having no local attachments, will be likely to be impartial between the differ-
ent States and their citizens and which, owing its official existence to the Union, will 
never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to the principle on which it is founded. 
THE FEDERAI.IST No. 80, at 478 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
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and immunities clause of article IV identified them with fundamen-
tal natural law rights. 
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens 
in the several states? We feel no hesitation in confining these 
expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their 
nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all 
free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by 
the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from 
the time of their becoming free, independent and sovereign. 120 
This view of article IV as a constitutional source for the protection 
of fundamental rights was stated in political arguments, and was 
applied by Chief Justice Taney as a basis for denying citizenship to 
blacks in Dred Scott v. Sanford. 121 
The language of the article can be read to grant specific rights to 
the individual, rather than simply protecting against discrimination. 
"The privileges and immunities" to which citizens of each state are 
entitled are those of "citizens in the several states." Although this 
may be interpreted as a reference to the privileges granted a citizen 
in each state separately, it literally can bear the meaning of privi-
leges so fundamental that they exist in all of the states. 122 
Professor Antieau argued that the fundamental rights interpre-
tation of the privileges and immunities clause explains the separa-
tion of the clauses on privileges and immunities of citizens and 
privileges and immunities of trade in the Articles of Confederation. 
The former, he maintained, applies to fundamental natural rights 
while the clause on trade applied only to prevent discrimination 
based on residence. It was the former, he noted, that was used in 
the Constitution. 123 
Finally, the charter clauses which foreshadowed the constitu-
tional provision were identified by 1774 with the natural rights of 
man. The pamphleteers of independence had abstracted from Eng-
lish law its "fundamental principles" as the privileges and immuni-
ties to which the colonists were entitled. The next logical step in 
this process of abstraction would be to identify the fundamental 
principles of English law as the fundamental rights of all citizens. 
The Declaration of Independence shifted colonial claims from the 
120. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1823). 
121. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See Bogen, The Transformation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: Reflections/rom the Admission of Maryland's First Black Lawyers, 44 Mo. L. 
REV. 939 (1985). 
122. See Antieau, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the True JlJeaning of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article Four, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv. I, 5 (1967). 
123. !d. at 3. 
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rights of Englishmen to the natural rights of man, and logically 
could have influenced the drafters of the Articles and the Constitu-
tion to include a clause protecting such fundamental rights. 124 
This array of arguments proved persuasive to a generation con-
fronted with the moral breakdown of society represented by slavery. 
Slavery was constitutional, but contrary to fundamental principles 
of natural law. The symbolic honor and integrity of the Constitu-
tion could be saved by identifying it with fundamental rights. This 
the framers of the fourteenth amendment attempted to do in the 
privileges and immunities clause of that amendment. The argu-
ments for a fundamental right interpretation are far less compelling 
to a modem generation more skeptical of the ability of anyone, 
much less a court, to define fundamental rights in a generally satis-
factory manner. 
The linguistic arguments for natural rights interpretation of arti-
cle IV ignore the drafting history of the clause. That history shows 
the privileges and immunities were to be based on those found in 
each state separately, rather than an abstraction common to all 
states. The committee that proposed the privileges and immunities 
clause of article IV of the Articles of Confederation specified that 
the privileges to which inhabitants of every state were entitled were 
"the rights and privileges of the natural born free Citizens of the 
State to which they go to reside." Only the right to travel was 
stated as an independent substantive right not based on the princi-
ple of nondiscrimination. Congressional revision removed the limi-
tation of the privileges and immunities clause to persons going to 
reside in another state, but retained the sense that the privileges and 
immunities to which the citizens of each state are entitled are those 
that citizens receive in the states to which they travel. The congres-
sional revision referred to the "privileges and immunities of free cit-
izens in the respective states" which clearly envisions serial 
privileges and immunities that differ from state to state. The ulti-
mate change of the Committee on Style for the Articles, replacing 
"respective" with the word "several" bears no hint of a change in 
meaning. 
Antieau's contention that the distinction between privileges of 
citizens and privileges of trade in the drafting of the Articles re-
124. But see J. REID, The Irrelevance of the Declaration, LAW IN THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION AND THE REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN LAW 46 (Hartog, ed. 1981). Reid ar-
gues that natural law was not a significant element in the Declaration. To the extent this is 
true, it becomes even more unlikely that the privileges and immunities clause had reference to 
natural law. 
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fleeted the distinction between fundamental rights and protection 
against discrimination also fails on analysis. Dickinson's draft used 
the standard of existing rights rather than fundamental rights. The 
later committee on amendments severed the clauses to restrict the 
general privileges and immunities clause application to persons 
changing residence. The separation of the clauses in the congres-
sional revision does not appear to work a sudden change in the prin-
ciple of all the earlier drafts which measured privileges and 
immunities by what existed for residents of the state in question. 
Finally, the historic identification of colonial charter provisions 
of the liberties of Englishmen with fundamental principles of natu-
ral law was based on the proposition that the rights that existed as 
positive law in England could be independently determined to be 
principles of natural law. Thus, natural law was not the source of 
the rights, it merely happened to coincide with the principles of 
government of Great Britain. When the colonists rested their 
claims to independence on natural rights in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, they chose language of "inalienable rights" and not the 
historically bound charter phrases of privilege, liberties, franchises 
or immunities. Thus, there is no basis for believing that the term 
"privileges and immunities" had altered its meaning from a refer-
ence to rights based on existing law to a natural law framework. 
The "fundamental right" vision of the "privileges and immuni-
ties" clause of article IV is, more importantly, inconsistent with the 
structure and history of the document. The purpose of the clause, 
stated in the Articles of Confederation, was "the better to secure 
and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people 
of the different states in this Union." This suggests that preventing 
parochialism was more important than individual rights. Article IV 
in the Articles of Confederation is the only provision in the docu-
ment using language of individual rights. The limited guarantee to 
individuals that states would not discriminate on the basis of state 
residence is a reasonable provision for federalism, but a national 
right to have a state afford each individual fundamental rights is 
inconsistent with the jealousy for state sovereignty manifested in the 
Articles. 
In the Constitution, the privileges and immunities clause is a 
part of an article that deals almost exclusively with problems of fed-
eralism rather than individual rights. 125 It does provide a right for 
125. Note, The Imerstate Privileges and Immunities: Fundamelltal Rights or Federalism, 
15 CAP. U. L. REV. 493, 499-50 (1986). 
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the individual, but the context demonstrates the rights are granted 
to promote interstate harmony rather than from concern for the 
individual. The link Hamilton made in The Federalist between the 
protection of the privileges and immunities clause and diversity of 
citizenship jurisdiction in article III supports this view. In the con-
t~xt of justifying the grant of diversity jurisdiction to federal courts, 
Hamilton wrote: 
To secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision against 
all evasion and subterfuge, it is necessary that its construction 
should be committed to that tribunal which, having no local at-
tachments, will be likely to be impartial between the different 
States and their citizens and which, owing its official existence to 
the Union, will never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to the 
principles on which it is founded. 126 
In Hamilton's view, then, the clause confers rights only on the 
citizen of one state with respect to privileges and immunities af-
forded him in another state. Thus, Hamilton may also be cited in 
support of the proposition that the clause secures only equality with 
residents. 
The Court agrees that article IV protects against discrimination 
and does not establish natural law rights. 
It has come to be the settled view that Article IV, § 2, does 
not import that a citizen of one State carries with him into an-
other fundamental privileges and immunities which come to him 
necessarily by the mere fact of his citizenship in the State first 
mentioned, but, on the contrary, that in any State every citizen of 
any other State is to have the same privileges and immunities 
which the citizens of that State enjoy. The section, in effect, pre-
vents a State from discriminating against citizens of other States 
in favor of its own. 127 
The history of the clause suggests that article IV is more than a 
mere prohibition against discrimination affecting nonresidents. It 
also is the source of a right to travel and a right to establish resi-
dence and become a citizen in a new state without being subjected 
to unwarranted residence requirements. In the years to come it will 
play an increasingly vital role in constitutional litigation. 
B. The Right to Travel 
In a concurring opinion in Zobel v. Williams, 128 Justice 
126. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 478 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
127. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939), cited in Baldwin v. Montana Fish & 
Game Comm·n, 436 U.S. 371, 382 (1978). 
128. 457 u.s. 55, 71 (1982). 
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O'Connor argued that the right to travel is based on the article IV 
privileges and immunities clause. "[A]pplication of the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause to controversies involving the 'right to 
travel' would at least begin the task of reuniting this elusive right 
with the constitutional principles it embodies." 129 
Justice O'Connor noted the right of free ingress and egress in 
article IV of the Articles of Confederation. Based on Pinckney's 
comment that article IV of the Constitution was based on the prin-
ciples of the Articles, she argued that it included the right to travel 
and that the omission of the express provision was to prevent redun-
dancy. O'Connor then recited early case law supporting article IV 
as the source for the right to interstate travel. 
In Corfteld v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1823), 
(No. 3,230) for example, Justice Washington explained that the 
Clause protects the "right of a citizen of one state to pass 
through, or to reside in any other state." Similarly, in Paul v. 
Virginia, 8 Wall., at 180, the Court found that one of the "un-
doubt[ed]" effects of the Clause was to give "the citizens of each 
State. . . the right of free ingress into other States, and egress 
from them." See also Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430 
(1871). Finally, in United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 297-
298 (1920), the Court found that the Clause fused two distinct 
concepts: (1) "the right of citizens of the States to reside peace-
fully in, and to have free ingress into and egress from" their own 
States, and (2) the right to exercise the same privileges in other 
States. 130 
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Zobel, in which Justices 
Blackmun, Marshall, and Powell joined, rejected O'Connor's views. 
"I note that the frequent attempts to assign the right to travel to 
some textual source in the Constitution seem to me to have proved 
both inconclusive and unnecessary." 131 He stated that the right 
may equally plausibly be found in the commerce clause or privileges 
and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. "In any 
event, in light of the unquestioned historic recognition of the princi-
ple of free interstate migration, and of its role in the development of 
the Nation, we need not feel impelled 'to ascribe the source of this 
right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional 
provision.' " 132 
Justice Brennan's nonchalance over the source of the right to 
travel may reflect his view that there are implicit constitutional 
129. !d. at 81. 
130. /d. at 80. 
131. !d. at 66. 
132. !d. at 67 (citation omitted). 
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rights derived from basic values of human dignity and responsibility 
which do not require specific textual justification. The "right to pri-
vacy," including the choice of whether to abort a fetus as set forth 
in Roe v. Wade 133 and subsequent cases, appears to be such a right. 
The strongest supporters of Roe on the Court have been the strong-
est opponents of O'Connor's attempt to root the right to travel in 
the text of the Constitution. If Roe is to survive, however, it should 
be justified on its own unique merits, for the right to travel has 
strong historical and textual support within the language of the 
document. 
Justice O'Connor apparently reasoned that the right to enter 
and to leave a state was a privilege or immunity of citizenship. The 
subject in colonial times was privileged to go anywhere within the 
dominions of the king, a right specifically protected by the Articles 
of Confederation and, therefore, a privilege of citizenship when the 
Constitution was adopted. 
The right is also implicit in the text. Article IV states that the 
citizen in one state is entitled to the privileges and immunities of 
citizens in another state. If the state of origin prohibits leaving, it 
will prevent a citizen from obtaining article IV privileges. Simi-
larly, if the state of destination excludes the citizen, it also obstructs 
obtaining the privileges. In Crandall v. Nevada, 134 Justice Miller 
deduced the right to travel from the citizen's right to obtain access 
to federal offices in states other than one's own. The same mode of 
reasoning applied to article IV demonstrates that citizens have a 
right to travel across state lines to obtain the treatment to which 
they are entitled. 135 
With history and text supporting an article IV right to travel, 
the court nonetheless rejected that clause. In Crandall v. Nevada, 
Nevada imposed a dollar tax on anyone leaving the state by com-
mercial carrier. The tax did not discriminate between citizens of 
Nevada and citizens of other states. It was collected by the carrier 
133. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
134. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867). 
135. The argument is not foolproof. A counter argument is that citizens are entitled to 
the privileges in another state only if they can get there. This position assumes that the clause 
is directed at state behavior with regard to persons who have traveled to it, preventing dis-
crimination within a state, and is not concerned with whether an individual may enter or 
leave the state. The right to enter or leave a state would then depend upon the rules applica-
ble to the state residents. This counterargument fits the language of the clause as well as the 
argument of the text, but it is historically and politically weak. The argument that an indi-
vidual right to obtain privileges in another state includes as a necessary corollary the right to 
travel there is a logical and supportable textual inference. 
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and paid to the state. Crandall refused to report the number of 
passengers carried out of state by his stage and refused to pay the 
tax. Nevada argued to the court that the state tax did not violate 
the commerce clause or the import clause. No right to travel was 
mentioned. Justice Miller agreed that the tax did not violate either 
clause but reversed the conviction on the grounds that the tax inter-
fered with the right to travel. Miller argued that interference with 
travel violated the supremacy clause because it impeded federal gov-
ernment operations by burdening persons who travel in order to 
deal with federal agencies. 136 The failure to cite article IV may have 
resulted from failure to argue it. Article IV is a better basis for the 
right to travel, because Miller's abstract argument only supports the 
right to travel to deal with the federal government. His method of 
argument applied to article IV, however, supports the right to travel 
interstate for any purpose. 
In Edwards v. California, 137 the Court struck down a California 
statute prohibiting the transportation of indigents into the state as 
invalidly interfering with interstate commerce. Justices Douglas 
and Jackson concurred on the grounds that the right was a privilege 
or immunity of federal citizenship under the fourteenth 
amendment. 
The majority preference for commerce clause analysis may have 
been affected by the state's "historical exception" argument. Cali-
fornia noted that the Articles of Confederation expressly excepted 
paupers from those entitled to the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens and argued that article IV was intended to perpetuate the Arti-
cles' limitations. The court may have feared that an article IV right 
to travel would perpetuate the restrictions on travel permissible in 
1787. An historical intent argument would similarly affect com-
merce clause use to prohibit the exclusion of paupers. If the com-
merce clause was "framed upon the theory that the peoples of the 
several States must sink or swim together," 138 the omission of the 
pauper exception in article IV constitutional privileges and immuni-
136. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); see also The Passenger 
Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283,492 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting) ("For all the great purposes 
for which the Federal government was formed, we are one people with one common country. 
We are all citizens of the United States; and as members of the same community. must have 
the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption. as freely as in our 
own States."). In Dred Scali v. Sandford, Taney indicated that the right to enter and ~tay in 
other states was one of the protected privileges. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393. 416-17 (1856). 
137. 314 u.s. 160 (1941). 
138. Baldwin v. Selig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935), quoted i11 Edwards v. California. 314 
u.s. 160, 174 (1941). 
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ties could result from a similar theory. More likely, the Framers 
understood that the right to travel was not unlimited. States re-
tained the right to exclude persons posing a danger to the state from 
crime (fugitives from justice) or contagion. 139 The Framers may 
have thought indigence posed a similar problem, but they did not 
embody any such assumption into the Constitution. The state need 
not support the poor, and poverty alone is not a threat to health or 
safety. As Justice Jackson said in the Edwards concurrence, "[t]he 
mere state of being without funds is a neutral fact- constitutionally 
an irrelevance, like race, creed or color."140 
Justices Douglas and Jackson disapproved of the majority's reli-
ance on the commerce clause as the source of individual rights. 141 
The commerce clause, although plausible support for Edwards, is 
weak support for the right to travel because it is a grant of power to 
Congress which could pass laws restricting travel. The Edwards 
concurrence relied instead on the fourteenth amendment privileges 
and immunities clause to recognize the right to travel as a privilege 
of national citizenship. 
Douglas's opinion rejected article IV as the basis of decision be-
cause it deals primarily "with the incidents of residence ... and the 
exercise of rights within a State, so a citizen of one State is not in a 
condition of alienage when 'he is within or when he removes to an-
other State.' " 142 He said that article IV cannot justify Crandall 
because the statute in that case applied both to Nevada citizens and 
to citizens of other states. But if the right to travel is found in arti-
cle IV as a corollary of the right to receive privileges in the several 
states, it applies to the natives of a state desiring to leave as well as 
to persons from other states desiring to enter. As a right secured by 
article IV to all citizens, under the fourteenth amendment it is also 
a privilege and immunity of United States citizenship. 143 The privi-
139. See Edwards, 314 U.S. at 184 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
140. /d. at 184-85. 
141. "To hold that the measure of his rights is the commerce clause is likely to result 
eventually either in distorting the commercial law or in denaturing human rights." /d. at 182 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
142. /d. at 180 (citation omitted). 
143. Douglas, referring to Miller's opinion in the Slaughterhouse Cases, said that "his 
failure to classify that right as one of state citizenship protected solely by Article IV, § 2, 
underscores his view that the free movement of persons throughout this nation was a right of 
national citizenship." /d. at 180. But Miller cited article IV of the Articles of Confederation, 
including the provision on free ingress and regress, stated the privileges and immunities of 
article IV of the Articles and of the Constitution are the same. and then said, "In the Articles 
of Confederation we have some of these specifically mentioned, and enough perhaps to give 
some general idea of the class of civil rights meant by the phrase." The Slaughterhouse 
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leges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment is not a 
separate source of rights under Justice Miller's interpretation in the 
Slaughterhouse Cases but protects only national privileges and im-
munities existing prior to the amendment's adoption. 144 
Justice Jackson's concurrence in Edwards pointed to the inter-
pretation of privileges and immunities as susceptible to a natural 
law interpretation that could free the Court to strike down any dis-
favored law without reference to specific values articulated in the 
document. Jackson wrote: 
For nearly three-quarters of a century this Court rejected every 
plea to the privileges and immunities clause [of the fourteenth 
amendment] .... This Court ... has always hesitated to give any 
real meaning to the privileges and immunities clause lest it im-
providently give too much. This Court should, however, hold 
squarely that it is a privilege of citizenship of the United States, 
protected from state abridgment, to enter any state of the Union, 
either for temporary sojourn or for the establishment of perma-
nent residence therein and for gaining resultant citizenship 
thereof. If national citizenship means less than this, it means 
nothing. 145 
This fear has distorted perceptions of article IV privileges and 
immunities. On its face, article IV should apply to citizens in the 
state of which they are citizens. That state is also one of "the sev-
eral states" in which they are entitled to the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens. If citizens of a state were to be protected only in 
states where they were not citizens, the article should have used the 
phrase "in any other of the states." But protecting a citizen in one's 
home state is meaningless unless one is entitled to some substantive 
right beyond that already possessed under state law. If article IV 
privileges and immunities include natural law principles, courts 
could invalidate state laws as contrary to natural law-the very fear 
that disturbed the Slaughterhouse majority: 
[Article IV] did not create those rights, which it called privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the states. It threw around them in 
that clause no security for the citizen of the state in which they 
were claimed or exercised. Nor did it profess to control the 
power of the state governments over the rights of its own 
citizens. 
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75 (1873). In listing the rights of national citizenship protected 
by the fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities clause, Miller included rights al-
ready protected by other clauses of the Constitution, such as the right to petition peacefully 
for redress of grievances. 
144. See The Slaughterhouse Cases, at 96 (Field, J., dissenting). 
145. 314 U.S. at 182-83 (footnote omitted). 
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Its sole purpose was to declare to the several states, that 
whatever those rights, as you grant or establish them to your 
own citizens, or as you limit or qualify, or impose restrictions on 
their exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall be the mea-
sure of the rights of citizens of other states within your 
jurisdiction. 146 
851 
Historically, the article IV privileges and immunities clause pro-
fessed to control state power over the right of citizens to leave and 
reenter. Recognition of that substantive right would not necessarily 
revive fundamental rights analysis or extend any greater right to a 
citizen in a state than the right to leave. 
One final reason for ignoring article IV as the source of the right 
to travel is the Court's holding that it protects only against state 
action. 147 Under those precedents, a constitutional right to travel 
against private interference must be traced to another source. 
Congress can legislate against private interference with inter-
state travel under the commerce clause. The pressure to find that 
such private behavior is not only subject to Congressional power 
but is itself a violation of the Constitution arose out of 1960's civil 
rights activity. Statutes enacted in the wake of the Civil War made 
deprivation of constitutional rights a federal criminal offense with-
out defining the rights. Congress enacted nothing specifically pun-
ishing interstate travel interference. When Lemuel Penn, a 
northern black visiting a family in the south, was shot by persons 
who thought he was working for civil rights, it affronted northern 
civil rights workers. However, state court prosecution for civil 
rights murders was difficult; several defendants were found not 
guilty of Penn's murder despite strong evidence. Federal authori-
ties tried to obtain a conviction in federal courts, but the only avail-
able statute applied to the deprivation of constitutional rights. In 
coping with the civil rights revolution and trying to find federal law 
applicable, the Court found a right of travel that may be claimed 
against individual as well as governmental interference. 148 The 
court ignored the constitutional text as an express source for the 
146. 83 U.S. at 77. 
147. In United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920), article IV was used as a basis for 
analyzing the right of interstate travel. That case resulted in dismissal of an indictment of 
private individuals for conspiracy to deprive individuals of their constitutional rights on the 
grounds that the right of interstate travel applies only against the state. The Court cited 
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) for the proposition that article IV privileges and 
immunities "like the 14th Amendment, is directed against state action." 106 U.~. at 643. 
Harris, however, did not deal with the right to travel. 
148. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). 
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right, because all texts appeared limited to establishing a right 
against the state. 
Curiously, article IV provides the best basis for finding a consti-
tutional right to travel applicable against individuals. Unlike the 
commerce clause, the inference of a right to travel is not drawn 
from the allocation of government power. Unlike the fourteenth 
amendment, article IV is an individual right rather than a limit on 
state power. Article IV privileges and immunities may be limited to 
those granted by the state, but if the right to travel is inferred from 
the entitlement to privileges in other states, any entity preventing 
the citizen of one state from traveling to another state to obtain 
rights from that state would be interfering with the constitutional 
right. Thus, the right to travel could be applicable not only against 
state government, but also against private individuals and the fed-
eral government. 
However, the scope of the article IV right is slightly ambiguous. 
The clause came from the Articles of Confederation provision in an 
agreement among independent sovereigns not directed at the con-
duct of individual citizens. The Continental Congress had no 
power to legislate for individuals and could not restrict interstate 
movement. The same clause in the Constitution had a new context. 
The agreement was "of the People" and not "of the States." Indi-
viduals theoretically could be bound by the document. Further, the 
federal government was given power to legislate directly upon indi-
viduals; therefore, federal power to restrict interstate movement be-
came relevant. The reasoning which applied the right to interstate 
travel against private interference is valid whether rooted in article 
IV or in purely structural analysis. Linguistically, article IV could 
ground the same inferences that the Court drew from the national 
structure. It is written in terms of an individual right to obtain 
privileges and immunities in other states, so interference with the 
implicit right to travel to get those privileges could be a violation of 
the right, whether by private persons or by government. 
Justice O'Connor is on excellent historical ground in rooting the 
right to travel in the article IV privileges and immunities clause. 
There are other advantages. Unlike the commerce clause, it can 
prohibit federal interference with interstate travel. Unlike the four-
teenth amendment, it is not linguistically confined to a governmen-
tal prohibition. The use of article IV as the basis for the right to 
travel supports an important guarantee with constitutional text. 
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C. The Right To Be Free of Discrimination Based on Place of 
Prior Residence 
Durational residence requirements for state governmental bene-
fits do not restrict travel; the new residents suffer no loss by such a 
requirement in their new state because they were receiving no bene-
fit from that state before they moved. Failure to grant the benefit is 
not a restriction on travel, but rather a discrimination against recent 
residents. That sort of discrimination led the Court to use equal 
protection analysis to test the validity of such durational residence 
requirements. 149 The Court frequently invalidated durational resi-
dence requirements because their purpose was to prevent residents' 
benefits from encouraging nonresidents to become residents. Dis-
couraging persons from becoming residents is not a legitimate state 
objective. National citizenship implies the right to travel to another 
state and to establish residence there. Thus, the Court t:efers to the 
right to travel in the durational residence cases but continues to use 
the equal protection clause rationale in its decisions. 150 It refuses to 
root the right to establish residence in a new state in article IV, 
leaving it a vague inference from the nature of national government. 
If the Court acknowledged article IV as the source of the right to 
establish residence and citizenship in another state, it could avoid 
equal protection analysis in these cases. 
These decisions have complicated an already complex equal pro-
tection analysis. The state may offer administrative convenience 
justifications for a residence requirement passing minimal scrutiny 
under equal protection, yet the Court finds the justifications inade-
quate. The higher degree of scrutiny does not flow from the denial 
of a fundamental right: the statute denies no fundamental right. 
The classification distinguishing between persons on the basis of 
length of residence does not share other suspect class characteris-
tics. As Justice Harlan argued in Shapiro, where the grant of a ben-
efit turns on the exercise or nonexercise of a protected right, the 
Court should normally analyze the state's behavior by whether it 
impairs the constitutional right and not whether it violates the equal 
protection clause. 
Justice O'Connor developed the article IV right to travel theory 
in Zobel in the context of an Alaskan statute that distributed sur-
plus state revenues to citizens on a graduated scale based on length 
of residence. The majority invalidated the statute under the equal 
149. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
150. Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 106 S. Ct. 2317 (1986). 
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protection clause, holding that rewarding citizens for past contribu-
tions was not a legitimate state purpose. Justice O'Connor dis-
agreed, noting that some forms of compensation for past service to 
the state should be permissible. The determination of proper forms 
of compensation for past services should be judged, she argued, 
under standards derived from article IV. Although she used the 
term "right to travel" in conformity with past Court usage in dura-
tiona! residence cases, article IV application to a durational resi-
dence requirement is a separate concern. 
Justice O'Connor noted that the clause assured a citizen of one 
state who ventures into another state the same privileges that citi-
zens of that state enjoy. If a nonresident who enters for temporary 
commercial purposes is protected, "[a} fortiori, the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause should protect the 'citizens of State A who ven-
tures into State B' to settle there and establish a home." 151 
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, contended that article IV could 
not apply to the Alaskan scheme because "the clause has no appli-
cation to a citizen of the State whose laws are complained of." 152 
Justice O'Connor responded that application of article IV was not 
limited to benefit nonresidents. 
The fact that this discrimination unfolds after the nonresident 
establishes residency does not insulate Alaska's scheme from 
scrutiny under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Each 
group of citizens who migrated to Alaska in the past, or chooses 
to move there in the future, lives in the State on less favorable 
terms than those who arrived earlier. The circumstances that 
some of the disfavored citizens already live in Alaska does not 
negate the fact that "the citizen of State A who ventures into 
[Alaska]" to establish a home labors under a continuous 
disability. 153 
Article IV supports Justice O'Connor's position. 154 It applies to 
citizens of each state "in the several states," including the citizen's 
home state. The courts rarely find that article IV binds a state with 
respect to its own citizens, fearing a judicially defined "fundamental 
right" state law limit. That fear is groundless in Justice O'Connor's 
limited article IV context. 
Article IV's privileges and immunities clause application to resi-
151. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 74 (1982). 
152. !d. at 84 n.3. 
153. !d. at 75. 
154. The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens 
(i.e., to become indistinguishable from natives) in the several states (i.e .. in any state of the 
union where they wish to go to become a citizen of that state). 
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dence requirements is historically correct. The earliest Articles of 
Confederation drafts of the clause specified application only to per-
sons going to reside in another state. Consequently, the concern 
that persons changing residence to a new state be treated as citizens 
in that state appears to be a major reason for the constitutional arti-
cle. The extension of the privileges and immunities of citizens to 
nonresidents was not intended to eliminate the earlier language's 
protection of new residents. Burke of North Carolina understood 
the clause to eliminate durational residence voting requirements. 
State constitutions had granted foreigners property rights upon en-
tering the state and swearing allegiance but imposed a one-year resi-
dence requirement to become a citizen. If article IV recaptured the 
colonial citizenship privileges and immunities, the right to become 
a citizen of a state by change of residence to that state is embodied 
in the clause. The framers understood that one of the substantive 
privileges of citizenship is freedom from discrimination based on 
place of prior residence. 
The adoption of the fourteenth amendment making state citi-
zenship a function of federal citizenship and state residence does not 
prevent article IV from conferring all the privileges and immunities 
of state citizenship on persons relocating to the state. The four-
teenth amendment citizenship provisions responded to Justice Ta-
ney's statement in Dred Scott that Blacks were not United States 
citizens and not entitled to sue as state citizens under article III 
diversity of citizenship provisions. The fourteenth amendment as-
sures that Blacks born in the United States are recognized as citi-
zens of both the United States and each state. 155 The fourteenth 
amendment determines who are the citizens of each state that are 
entitled under article IV to the privileges and immunities of citizens 
in the several states. Article IV secures the substantive right to a 
citizen of a state to not be discriminated against on the basis of prior 
residence. 
Article IV's history does not foreclose all durational residence 
requirements. A provision enacted to promote federalism amid an 
article that secures in each state full faith and credit for the laws of 
other states should not be interpreted to forbid state residence re-
quirements established to prevent the evasion of other states' poli-
155. In Gassies v. Bailon, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 761 (1832), the Supreme Court held that an 
allegation of United States citizenship and Louisiana residence is the equivalent of an allega-
tion of state citizenship for article III purposes. Thus, the proposition that state citizenship 
was a function of residence plus federal citizenship was accepted prior to the fourteenth 
amendment. 
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cies. 156 Residence requirements for voting and holding office 
existed when the privileges and immunities clause was adopted, 
although there was some uncertainty over its effect on them. The 
rationale for the limits may have been the difficulty in ascertaining 
an individual's permanent intention to reside when interstate com-
munication was by horse or sail and checking past residence was 
difficult and time consuming. Modern consideration of the consti-
tutionality of residence requirements must take into account im-
provements in transportation and communication. Durational 
residence requirements to establish the bona fides of the residence 
claim may also be affected by the nature of the benefit sought. The 
decisions need not be affected by changing the analysis from equal 
protection to article IV. Article IV analysis, however, assures that 
the court will focus on the impact of the residence requirement on 
full recognition as citizen of the state. 
D. The Right of Nonresidents to Freedom from Discrimination 
The current Court disagrees over article IV's application to the 
right to travel and durational residence cases, but agrees that the 
clause prohibits discrimination in the privileges and immunities of 
citizens against nonresidents entering the state. It further disagrees 
on the meaning of "privilege or immunity" and distinguishes state 
laws under article IV, holding some laws create privileges and im-
munities of citizenship and some do not. The right to engage in a 
trade or business is a privilege or immunity of citizenship. 157 The 
right to hunt elk is not, because it is not "basic to the maintenance 
or well-being of the Union." 158 The Court has avoided defining the 
phrase beyond that necessary to each decision. 159 Among the rights 
outside the clause are the right to vote160 and the right to state-
owned goods. 161 Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall reject this 
method of analysis. They would find that all rights of citizens are 
privileges and immunities and would decide the cases solely on 
whether the discrimination against nonresidents is justified. 162 
The majority suggests a two-step analysis under the article IV 
privileges and immunities clause: first, whether the particular law 
156. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975). 
157. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985). 
158. Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978). 
159. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870). 
160. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874). 
161. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 386. 
162. /d. at 394 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall and White.) 
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involves a privilege or immunity of citizenship; and, if so, whether 
the different nonresident treatment is justified. The dissenters con-
tend that only the second step is relevant. The selective colonial 
application of privileges and immunities and the exclusion of local 
variations from coverage were justified by local conditions. An ade-
quate justification for disparity in treatment meant that a particular 
law was not a privilege or immunity. The court should borrow 
from dormant commerce clause analysis in which initial attempts to 
define its operation on a categorical basis were rejected in favor of 
an individualized analysis. 163 Privileges and immunities analysis 
should be parallel: citizens of each state are entitled to all rights 
afforded state natives unless there is a valid ground for denial. 164 
163. Julian Eule has suggested that the article IV privileges and immunities clause is the 
appropriate constitutional text for use in proscribing protectionist state legislation. Eule, 
Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 44648 {1982). He would 
view the commerce clause as purely a grant of power to the federal government without 
implying any restriction on state power. 
Madison's criticism of the violations of the Articles of Confederation privileges and im-
munities clause was leveled at state laws taxing vessels at a differential rate based on the 
owner's and crew's state of citizenship. The practice of port states taxing the imports of other 
states trading through them, however, he said resulted from the Jack of a general commerce 
power. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Where the discrimination was based on 
place of origin or destination of the goods or services rather than the trader's place of resi-
dence, there was no apparent violation of the privileges and immunities clause. Instead of 
protecting free trade, the clause protected only the recognition of common citizenship as it 
had existed prior to independence. A shift from reliance on the commerce clause to article IV 
reliance to protect interstate commerce would not only be inconsistent with the history of the 
clauses, but could curtail existing flexibility. Under the commerce clause, Congress may au-
thorize state Jaws that protect local industries if it finds such behavior desirable. The privi-
leges and immunities clause is drafted as an individual right, however, and it would not be 
reasonable to permit Congress to deprive individuals of constitutional rights. For that rea-
son, extension of article IV to perform tasks it was not designed to do is dangerously unwise. 
164. This past term the Supreme Court heard a case in which the federal district court in 
New Orleans refused to admit to practice before it, a member of the Louisiana bar who lived 
and had his office in Mississippi. Frazier v. Heebe, 107 S. Ct. 2607 (1987). A similar state 
residence requirement was held to violate article IV when applied by a state. Supreme Court 
of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985). One issue raised in the case was whether article IV 
restricted the federal government as opposed to solely states, however, the Supreme Court did 
not reach the article IV question and reversed on different grounds. 
The Court has labeled article IV privileges and immunities as those of state citizenship. 
That labeling dissipates any article IV claim against the federal government because it indi-
cates that the claimant is entitled only to the treatment given a citizen by the state. If the 
clause requires that nonresident citizens be treated as citizens of that state, regardless of the 
source of treatment, article IV applies. The framers of article IV chose individual rights 
language rather than language of state restriction. On the other hand, the framers did not 
envision the current scope of federal power. A national government more provincial than the 
states themselves was not considered, and the clause was initially in a document consisting 
soley of separate state sovereigns. Thus history and language point in different directions. 
If article IV does not bind the federal government, Congress might authorize state dis-
crimination against nonresidents. The state Jaw might be invalid as state Jaw under article 
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One reason for adopting the dissenters' view is that the language 
of article IV was intended to perform several different functions. 
For the person changing residence, it secured every right of a citi-
zen. Thus, the all encompassing definition is warranted. This was 
the practice that preceded the constitutional provision. On the 
other hand, the nonresident who visited the state did not have the 
same rights as citizens of the state. Visitors could not vote and they 
were subject to differences in civil process because of the problems 
of exercising power over nonresidents. "Privileges and immunities" 
function differently depending on the individual claimant's status. 
One is entitled to a particular benefit or exemption from a burden if 
there is no adequate justification for distinction. A citizen of the 
United States has a privilege or immunity to not be discriminated 
against on the basis of place of residence without adequate justifica-
tion. Exclusion and protectionism are inadequate justifications. 
Determination of the sufficiency of justifications for differential 
treatment of persons based on citizenship is still in a formative 
stage. Efforts to draw the lines of permissible distinctions depend 
more on current analysis than historic meaning, because the draft-
ers paid little attention to the specific problems. Elaboration on the 
manner of linedrawing has already begun. 165 
The nondiscrimination issue may arise in a unique fashion. 
Most laws favoring residents over nonresidents in trading run afoul 
of commerce clause restrictions as well as article IV problems. 
Privileges and immunities discrimination analysis is invoked pri-
marily where the law addresses nonresidents doing intrastate busi-
ness. It is thus particularly relevant to the problems raised by the 
application of the "market participant" commerce clause doctrine. 
The Supreme Court has held that states are not subject to com-
merce clause restrictions when acting as market participants rather 
than as market regulators. Thus, the state may choose to buy goods 
or services from, or to sell to, residents exclusively without implicat-
IV, but it could escape scrutiny incorporated as federal law. The structure and placement of 
this right indicates a concern for federalism rather than for an individual's protection. Never-
theless, the article requires that the right to interstate travel be secure against national as well 
as local restriction. 
Article IV applied to the federal government would not inhibit justifiable federal legisla-
tion preferring residents of a state. It permits discrimination against nonresidents who pose a 
problem separate from parochial state interests in excluding community nonmembers. If the 
clause does not apply, the federal government may discriminate against nonresidents simply 
to satisfy parochial interests. A congressional majority could be mustered for provincialism, 
but it would destroy the article IV's national sense of citizenship. 
165. See Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 
(1981). 
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ing the commerce clause. 166 Nevertheless, in United Building & 
Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 167 the Court held 
that such purchase and sale decisions are subject to article IV privi-
leges and immunities. The Court remanded the case to determine 
whether the nonresidents constituted a "peculiar source of the evil 
at which the statute is aimed." 168 
Article IV applies to state and municipal market decisions when 
government decisions turn on the residence of the employees and 
management of a company rather than on its state of incorporation. 
Thus, although a corporation may lack article IV rights, 169 its em-
166. Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980) (South Dakota operated a cement plant 
restricting sales to state residents. Supreme Court held the resident-preference program did 
not violate commerce clause (citing Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 
(1976) ( .. Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the 
absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to 
favor its own citizens over other.")); White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Em-
ployers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983) (Supreme Court held that commerce clause does not prevent 
mayor from requiring construction projects to employ at least 50% city residents). 
167. 465 u.s. 208 (1984). 
168. Id. at 222. 
169. Under the current Supreme Court decisions, the privileges and immunities clause 
applies only to human beings. Corporations are not .. citizens" for the purposes of article IV. 
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868). Hamilton linked article IV protections to 
article III diversity jurisdiction, and Taney did the same in Dred Scott. Nevertheless, present 
doctrine allows corporations to sue and be sued as citizens under the diversity of jurisdiction 
provisions of article III but does not permit them to claim article IV privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens. 
The exclusion of corporations from article IV protection has been criticized. 
The notion that corporations are not citizens for purposes of the privileges and 
immunities clause is more venerable than sound. It is, after all, people who do 
business in the corporate form, and the underlying antidiscrimination objectives of 
the clause can be thwarted as much by state discrimination against businesses incor-
porated in other states as by state discrimination against natural persons who make 
their homes in other states. 
Varat, supra note 176, at 499 n.47. 
The framers of the privileges and immunities clause did not consider corporations to be 
citizens for the purposes of the clause. The various drafts of the article as it wound its way 
into the Articles of Confederation referred to the protected class as .. inhabitants," .. citizens," 
and .. free inhabitants." The standard of protection is variously the privileges of .. natives," 
.. natural born free Citizens," and .. free citizens." These terms, especially the adjective .. free," 
are applied to human beings and not abstract entities. The term .. citizen" in the Constitution 
bears no indicia of an alteration to give it a special meaning applicable to corporations. 
When the article was adopted, the corporation was an exceptional mode of doing busi-
ness. Legislatures were suspicious of the corporate form. They granted charters only for 
exceptional purposes such as educational institutions, canals and water companies. J. DAVIS, 
EsSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 22 (1917). If the grant of 
corporate status by one state were thought capable of imposing that corporation on other 
states, it would have aroused the bitter opposition of every state in the union. Madison had 
even noted that the power of a state to confer citizenship on an individual on a different basis 
than that of other states had been a source of friction for article IV of the Articles of Con fed-
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ployees may claim that the state's market decisions deny those 
rights to them. 
Neither language nor history helps much in assessing the appro-
priateness of the Court's application of article IV to governmental 
behavior as a market participav.t. Language alone does not deter-
mine whether the opportunity to compete for government contracts 
is a privilege or immunity of citizens in the state. The circum-
stances of eighteenth-century governmental behavior mask the 
Framers' intent. Difficulty in transportation and communication 
largely confined governmental purchases and sales to local busi-
nesses. The creation of local preferences in this manner is not rele-
vant to the constitutional issue. 
Where an issue is not determined by language or history, a deci-
sion should be based on policy consistent with the constitutional 
language, history and structure. Article IV does not have the free 
trade focus of the commerce clause for which the state's regulatory 
or participatory character is relevant. Article IV creates a common 
national citizenship for citizens of the several states. The relevance 
of the state of residence is diminished. In that context, the Court's 
response is appropriate. States may favor residents in using their 
resources to participate in the market, but the favoritism must be 
eration. Thus, the grant to Congress of power to make uniform rules for naturalization was 
an important element in improving the function of article IV in the Constitution. 
Although the history of article IV demonstrates conclusively that corporations were not 
considered "citizens" for article IV purposes when the Constitution was adopted, the corpo-
ration has substantially altered its place in American society since that date. Exclusion of 
corporations from the ambit of article IV had little significance in 1787 when the small 
number of existing corporations were local in scope, and almost all business was conducted 
by individuals or partnerships. Corporate status is no longer a jealously guarded special priv-
ilege, but a readily available status frequently used by almost every form of business en-
deavor. Thus, Jonathan Varat has suggested that corporations should be considered 
"citizens" for article IV purposes in order to assure the vindication of the overriding purpose 
of nondiscrimination. 
The interests of article IV in preventing state discrimination against nonresidents have not 
been ignored by the Supreme Court in connection with corporations. Instead, it has used the 
commerce clause and the equal protection clause to preserve the market viability of the com-
panies incorporated in other states. One crucial step in the Court's article IV analysis was 
that the corporation's characteristics are not natural ones but defined by state law. Conse-
quently, a corporation has no existence as such in any state where it is not incorporated. This 
led to decisions permitting states to charge a special tax of companies incorporated in other 
states as a "privilege" of doing business within a state. With the demise of the "privilege" 
tax, there is little need for additional protection for corporations under article IV. 
The application of article IV results in an individual right that cannot be removed by 
Congress. It seems unwise to extend to the artificial creatures of a state a right to be free from 
discriminatory regulation by other states even where Congress finds such discrimination 
desirable. 
HeinOnline -- 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 861 1986-1987
1987] PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 861 
justified. Therefore, the relevance of residence becomes the crucial 
issue when applying article IV. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The constitutional article IV privileges and immunities clause 
evolved from a national colonial heritage. Colonial inhabitants 
were all originally the King's subjects, and no colony treated the 
inhabitants of other colonies as aliens. The Declaration of Indepen-
dence destroyed this basis for unity. Article IV of the Articles of 
Confederation supplied the missing ties and preserved each of the 
colonial rights-to move freely between colonies, to be treated as a 
native of any colony where residence was established, and to be free 
of discrimination based on place of birth in commercial dealings. 
The Articles provided no common sovereign for the people of 
the states. Individuals were citizens of a state according to state 
law. The only basis for national citizenship was asserted through 
the privileges and immunities clause. The Constitution created a 
national government which unified the disparate state governments. 
The constitutional privileges and immunities clause again cemented 
the ties among the states, but United States citizenship altered the 
clause's meaning and effect: a single sentence accomplished the di-
verse functions of the Articles of Confederation's provisions. 
The clause's origin in the traditional rights of Englishmen pro-
duced an ambiguity which has been the source of a restricted consti-
tutional definition of privileges and immunities. Colonists referred 
to the rights of Englishmen when they claimed broader rights of 
self-government and individual liberty than England granted them. 
When they decided to break with England, they justified their ac-
tion by claiming they had been denied not just the rights of English-
men, but of all people. 
The privileges and immunities clause was intended to secure the 
former intercolonial privileges of movement, citizenship, and trade. 
It was not intended to institute natural law concepts; but the use of 
language that had been appropriated in political argument for that 
purpose enabled later generations to confiate and thus utterly con-
fuse the possible meanings of the clause. One consequence of that 
confusion has been to discourage the Court from resting any sub-
stantive rights in the language of article IV. Recent attempts by 
Justice O'Connor to return the Court to article IV as the source of 
basic rights of interstate movement may restore the original promi-
nence of that provision. 
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